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Is the criminalization of consensual sex between close relatives
constitutional in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell v.
Hodges? Justice Scalia thought not. The substantive due process
landscape has changed dramatically in response to the LGBTQ
movement. Yet, when a girl in a sexual relationship with her father
recently revealed in an anonymous interview with New York Maga-
zine that they were planning to move to New Jersey, one of the only
two states where incest was legal, the New Jersey legislature intro-
duced with unprecedented speed a bill criminalizing incest. But who
has the couple harmed? The very mention of incest conjures fears of
deformed babies, yet when people think about sex in most other con-
texts, procreation is the last thing on their minds. Steeped in a near-
universal incest taboo, judges are unlikely to strike down incest legis-
lation any time soon. But they must still respond to any constitu-
tional challenge in the language of the law. This Article evaluates
the constitutionality of criminalizing sexual relationships between
first-degree relatives. First, the Article situates incest statutes within
the sociological incest taboo and the biological mechanism known as
the Westermarck Effect. It asserts that incest laws are counter-natu-
ral exercises in socio-biological engineering. Second, it argues that
incest cannot be excluded from the fundamental rights to sexual inti-
macy and reproduction. Third, it questions the constitutional suffi-
ciency of a range of possible government interests, and the tailoring
of existing laws to those interests. Fourth, it proposes revised statutory
language that would prohibit certain incestuous relationships with-
out violating the constitution. The Article concludes by suggesting
that norms against incest, like norms against same-sex relationships,
can change and may already be changing.
* I offer my sincerest and deepest gratitude to Professors Michael Klarman and
Laurence Tribe. Without their teaching, guidance, and invaluable comments, this
paper would not have been possible. An early draft of this Article was awarded
Harvard Law School’s prize for best paper on an LGBTQ legal issue for 2015.
** Disclaimer: the views and opinions expressed in this Article are solely the author’s own,
and do not reflect, and are not in any way associated with, any institutions,
organizations, or business entities with which the author has been, is currently, or will be
affiliated.
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“Tell me, then: what’s wrong with incest?”. . . .
. . . “You breed too close, you get faulty offspring. Idiots
and dead babies without heads and all that.”
“I knew it! . . . Isn’t it wonderful? From the rocky depths
of a Stone Age culture . . . all the way out to the computer
technocracies, . . . you ask that question and you get that answer.
It’s something everybody just knows. You don’t have to look at
the evidence”. . . .
. . . “Sex is a pretty popular topic on most worlds. Almost
every aspect of it that is ever mentioned has almost nothing to
do with procreation. . . . But mention incest, and the response
always deals with offspring. Always! To consider and discuss a
pleasure or love relationship between blood relatives, you’ve ap-
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parently got to make some sort of special mental effort that no-
body, anywhere, seems able to do easily – some not at all.”1
INTRODUCTION
Behind the privacy curtain lurks the incest specter—or so the critics
warn. In his 1961 Poe v. Ullman2 dissent, Justice Harlan declared that “the
right of privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not sug-
gest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from
criminal enquiry, however privately practiced. So much has been explicitly
recognized in acknowledging the State’s rightful concern for its people’s
moral welfare.”3 Justice Harlan hoped to reassure his colleagues on the
bench that a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause, one guarantee-
ing married couples’ access to contraceptives as derivative of a constitutional
“privacy” principle, would not invalidate prohibitions on activities that were
facially repugnant to Justice Harlan and his contemporaries. Four years
later, Griswold v. Connecticut held that the right to privacy prevents states
from criminalizing the use of contraceptives by married couples in the pri-
vacy of the bedroom.4 Griswold gave rise to an active and ongoing privacy
jurisprudence grounded, as Justice Harlan originally urged, in the Due Pro-
cess Clause.5 Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent is now the law of the land, and at
least one element in his parade of horribles—homosexuality—has joined
access to contraceptives beneath the privacy umbrella.6 Justice Harlan has
been gainsaid by history. “The state’s rightful concern for its people’s moral
welfare” has not only failed to limit the reach of substantive due process, but
since Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans,7 the soundness of morality as a
government interest, without more, has become increasingly dubious.8
Incest is one of the last taboos. It implicates three major substantive
due process frontiers: sexual autonomy, reproductive rights, and marriage.
As such, a candid conversation about its constitutional place has become
1. Theodore Sturgeon, If All Men Were Brothers, Would You Let One Marry Your Sister?,
in DANGEROUS VISIONS 344, 380-82 (Harlan Ellison ed., 1967).
2. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
3. Poe, 367 U.S. at 552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. See 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the fundamental
right to marry includes marriage between two people of the same sex); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that laws criminalizing sodomy between two
people of the same sex violated a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause).
7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
8. See discussion infra Part III(a).
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essential to understanding both our evolving privacy jurisprudence and the
role of morality in law. But as Courtney Cahill observed, in the legal imagi-
nation, incest has become the “archetypal form of boundary violation and a
potent symbol of disgust . . . legal actors, policymakers, and others have
turned to incest as an object of comparison to a range of relationships that
provoke disgust in ways that recall the mythic horror of the incest taboo.”9
Incest, in short, is now treated as a constitutional laugh-out-loud test; if a
court decision compels the decriminalization of incest, the decision must
not have been constitutionally compelled. While gay-rights activists use
“like-race” arguments to attack sodomy prohibitions, 10 their opponents
counter, as Justice Harlan did, with “like-incest” justifications. For instance,
justices opposed to the juridification of the gay-rights movement seized on
incest as the centerpiece of a new parade of horribles. Justice White wrote in
Bowers v. Hardwick that “if respondent’s submission is limited to the volun-
tary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult, except
by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving ex-
posed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though
they are committed in the home.”11 When Lawrence overturned Bowers be-
cause the privacy principle “gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex,”12
Justice Scalia wrote in passionate dissent that:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, pros-
titution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and ob-
scenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation
of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is
called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no
effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its
holding.13
The majority offered but a brief reply to the Scalian slope; Lawrence “does
not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or
9. Courtney Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Dis-
gust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2005).
10. See Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Represen-
tation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 115 (David Kairys ed., 1998) (problematizing the
use of like-race arguments by LGBTQ legal advocates).
11. 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986).
12. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
13. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily
be refused.”14
Only a handful of academics have attempted to respond to the right’s
incest challenge in the constitutional context. In 1984, Carolyn Bratt first
took the Incest Horrible to its logical extreme by arguing that there is a
constitutional right to marry, that only a “substantial, important state inter-
est can justify such an intrusion into the individual’s choice of marriage
partner, [that] only a statute narrowly tailored to accomplish such a purpose
is permissible.”15 She rejected the constitutional sufficiency of government
interests in genetics, morality, protecting the family unit, and protecting
children. But not only has medical and social science come a long way in
the three decades since, significant new developments in the case-law have
dated Bratt’s article.
Brett McDonnell revisited the topic in 2004, shortly after Lawrence.
He posited that the core of incest prohibitions against sex between parents
and their biological children and between biological siblings would more
likely than not survive some form of heightened rational basis review,
though government rationales predicated on genetics or social structuring
may fail strict scrutiny if the statute in question also proscribes relationships
between adopted relatives.16 McDonnell argued that, given the near univer-
sal prohibition of incest by the states, “incest is clearly not a fundamental
right with ancient roots.”17 History matters to a “liberal Burkean majority of
the Court” which, McDonnell believed, “did not jump the gun in Law-
rence. They did not want to get ahead of the prevailing moral views of their
time, and they have not done so.”18
Just a year later, a student note in the DePaul Law Review came to the
opposite conclusion.19 Brendan Hammer argued that in Muth v. Frank the
7th Circuit erred in sustaining Wisconsin’s criminal incest statute by inter-
14. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
15. Carolyn Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free
to Marry?, 18 FAM. L. Q. 257, 266 (1984).
16. Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337, 352, 355
(2004).
17. Id. at 351.
18. Id. at 360.
19. Brendan Hammer, Note, Tainted Love: What the Seventh Circuit Got Wrong in Muth
v. Frank, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1065, 1081 (2007). Another student note in the
Harvard Law Review, arguing for improved incest legislation turning on the consent
versus non-consent fulcrum, also opines briefly that, “in a post-Lawrence v. Texas
world, it is at least highly problematic to retain laws that can criminalize consensual
intimate relationships on the basis of nothing more than unexplained references to
‘morality’ or ‘family.’ ” Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow
of the ‘Sexual Family’, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2467 (2006).
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preting Lawrence as applicable only to homosexual sodomy.20 Hammer
noted that Lawrence was not a “narrow precedent,” but rather, was “broadly
and generously written.”21 Hammer’s note advocated complete autonomy
between consenting adults in the bedroom, declaring that “love is a passion-
ate and profound area of mankind’s existence. The criminal law is ill-
equipped to enter into such an area, and it should probably not attempt to
do so absent realistic harm to another person.”22 In stark juxtaposition,
however, John Tuskey harnessed that same argument—that Lawrence is
broadly written—to push Justice Scalia’s original objection that the right
Lawrence recognized is overly broad. Tuskey wrote that the 7th Circuit had
little option but to “read Lawrence more narrowly than its language would
seem to allow.”23 Tuskey accused the Supreme Court of playing politics:
“The [Lawrence] Court has applied the . . . definition of liberty arbitrarily,
in effect exposing [it] as a trump card to play when necessary to hold un-
constitutional, without any real basis in the Constitution, statutes a major-
ity of Justices find objectionable.”24 The Hammer-Tuskey dichotomy
exemplifies how substantive due process opponents rally behind incest as a
monster Lawrence released, even whilst some in the sexual autonomy move-
ment deny the very premise that incest is a monster to be caged.
These competing policy agendas are a major theme in Cahill’s 2005
article explicating her boundary violation theory, described supra. The most
thorough examination of the Incest Horrible so far, Cahill departed from
the blackletter approach taken by Bratt, McDonnell, Hammer, and Tuskey,
focusing instead on how incest “has been used to define a normative vision
of sexuality and the family.”25 Cahill first argued that incest is “a bad fit for
slippery slope arguments.” 26 Some aspects of the Incest Horrible have al-
ready been realized because incest is not an easily delineated, cohesive con-
cept. Rather than a “monolithic taboo,” incest varies “from state to state,
including who can commit, and what constitutes incest . . . it is unlikely
that same-sex marriage will cause us to slide down the slope because in some
ways we have already slipped.”27 To Cahill, harm-based rationales cannot
explain why incestuous relationships must be legally invalid.28 Rather, “the
20. Hammer, supra note 19, at 1081 (discussing Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005)).
21. Id. at 1081.
22. Id. at 1098.
23. John Tuskey, What’s a Lower Court to Do? Limiting Lawrence v. Texas and the Right
to Sexual Autonomy, 21 TOURO L. REV. 597, 663 (2005).
24. Id.
25. Cahill, supra note 9, at 1546.
26. Id. at 1548.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1571.
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emotion of disgust” is the only explanation for the “depth and breadth of
the incest taboo and its persistent place of ‘honor’ at the bottom of the
slippery slope.”29 Cahill asked rhetorically:
But should disgust, which is largely socially contingent, carry the
freight of such a powerful metaphorical symbol?  In other words,
should we be so confident in our “tastes” (disgust) that we per-
mit them to dictate proscribed and prescribed forms for the ex-
pression of the basic human need for intimacy? Or should the
law reappraise the breadth of the incest prohibition and the ex-
tent to which incest-revulsion substitutes for rational evaluation
of same-sex marriage and other “deviant” relationships?30
Cahill also questioned traditional rationales for incest legislation, suggesting
that genetic harm and child abuse justifications “fail both to capture the full
range of disgust that incest represents and to explain why incest remains a
potent symbol of non-normative sexuality.”31 But having undermined the
underpinnings of incest prohibition Cahill pointedly did not offer a verdict
on their constitutionality.32 Instead, she implied that a compelling counter-
vailing state interest could be located in “anthropological accounts that have
highlighted [incest’s] socially-constructed character.”33 Cahill noted approv-
ingly that “at least one court—the Supreme Court of Georgia in Benton v.
State—has recognized the cultural origin of the incest taboo when stating
that ‘being primarily cultural in origin, the taboo is neither instinctual nor
biological, and it has very little to do with actual blood ties.’ ” 34
Cahill responds to Justice Scalia: be careful what you wish for. But at
the same time, she dodged the actual question: does Lawrence undermine
criminal prohibitions on incest? By doing so she avoided a legalist mire. The
majority of constitutional cases may have clear answers,35 but sexual auton-
omy is at the forefront of a narrow and perpetually shifting no-man’s-land
29. Id. at 1549.
30. Id. at 1549-50.
31. Id. at 1548-49.
32. See id. at 1547 (“As a normative matter, I am more interested here in examining and
critiquing the way in which the incest taboo has defined the other limits of kinship
than in assessing whether laws against incest either will, or should, be repealed.”)
33. Id. at 1611.
34. Id. at 1609.
35. Or at least answers the vast majority of justices agree upon. See, e.g., Kedar Bhatia, A
Few Notes on Unanimity, SCOTUSBLOG (July 10, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2014/07/a-few-notes-on-unanimity/ (finding that 66% of judg-
ments and 52% of majority opinions in the 2013 term were unanimous. 38% of
cases were completely unanimous with no concurrences or dissents.).
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of doctrinal change situated in between established realms of clearly consti-
tutional and clearly not. Additionally, incest is one of the ultimate violations
of communal norms. When these two factors coincide, extra-legal consider-
ations are at their ascendancy, and determining the constitutionality of in-
cest legislation seems a futile exercise in straw grabbing. But Cahill’s
hedging was similarly futile. Incest is indeed a diffuse phenomenon. Never-
theless, the reality that we “have already slipped” 36 does not undermine the
considerable rhetorical force of Justice Scalia’s Lawrence dissent. The image
Justice Scalia conjured is not of relationships on the fringe of non-normative
behavior. It is the prospect of sexual relations between fathers and their
biological daughters or between biological brothers and sisters, of deformed
offspring, of an incestuous road to the church altar. Does Lawrence mandate
the legalization of consensual adult incest?  If so, can states prohibit blood
relatives from procreating? Must states also sanction their unions? The only
way to resolve the “slippery slope” argument is to address it directly.
Deflection silences the cause of incestuous couples in the interests of
the LGBTQ culture war. The Incest Horrible is not just a hypothetical
illuminating other rights; real people want to pursue incestuous relationships
without fear of criminal punishment. In December 2010, David Epstein, a
political science professor at Columbia University, was charged with incest
under New York law after being accused of having a three-year consensual
relationship with his biological daughter, then in her early-twenties. Ep-
stein’s daughter was over 18 when the relationship began, and the two sup-
posedly exchanged “twisted text messages.”37 Epstein’s daughter refused to
testify against him, and he pled guilty to “attempted incest,” a misde-
meanor.38 Epstein’s daughter was not charged. Did the Epsteins have a right
to maintain their relationship free from government intrusion? If not, how
do we determine who is the “victim” and who is the “perpetrator?” What if
the case involved twins instead? Consensual participants in incest could be
our neighbors, friends, students, or professors, and the constitutional co-
nundrum amounts to more than the interstices of familiar jurisprudential
battlefields.
Evaluations of Supreme Court precedent from a doctrinal perspective
have become less popular in recent years. Many scholars have argued,
broadly speaking, that the Court often decides constitutional issues in ac-
36. Cahill, supra note 9, at 1548.
37. Columbia Professor Charged With Sleeping With Daughter, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec.
10, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/10/david-epstein-incest-
char_n_794864.html.
38. David Epstein Pleads Guilty to Misdemeanor Incest, HUFFINGTON POST, June 10,
2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/21/david-epstein-pleads-
guil_n_881639.html.
2016] T H E  I N C E S T  H O R R I B L E 195
cordance with prevailing societal winds.39 No doubt, the Justices are as
steeped in communal norms as everyone else. Indeed, considering their av-
erage age, the Justices’ vision of propriety may tend to be a few years out of
date. But we must be careful not to dismiss the explanatory power of doctri-
nal reasoning too quickly. In a 2013 speech on the subject of same-sex
marriage, Justice Kennedy voiced his worries that if “[w]e come in too soon
and too broad, we terminate” the democratic debate on marriage equality.40
But he also mused, “ ‘suppose you have a person with an injury, a person is
hurting. He comes to court seeking relief.’ The court could say ‘go away for
10 years, then I’ll see you . . . That would be better for the court,’ but the
individual might be denied his or her rights in the interim.”41 Two years
later, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell recognized that the
fundamental right to marriage protects same-sex relationships. “The dy-
namic of our constitutional system,” he proclaimed, “is that individuals
need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.”42
This undermines the notion that Justice Kennedy and his fellow Justices
believe that constitutional meaning is determined by the culture war victors.
The judicial outcome may well turn on external factors like intuitions
about permissible behavior, changes in popular opinion, and the Justices’
concerns about interfering with a nearly-universal taboo. But constitutional
law must nevertheless be performed in the language of legal doctrine, and at
present, considerable doctrinal ambiguity exists. For one, Lawrence does not
explicitly specify the applicable tier-of-scrutiny for intrusions on our right to
sexual intimacy, while Obergefell speaks directly only on same-sex couples’
right to marry. Indeed, even if Lawrence did state the level of scrutiny used
39. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 381 (2009) (“Consensus was a long time developing, but when it did, the
justices’ interpretation of the Constitution gave way to popular will. The justices in
Brown v. Board of Education argued they were protecting constitutional rights, but
once again it was evolving national views that supported the Court’s judgment and
enabled its enforcement.”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH:
HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (1996) (calling
for a reexamination of recent cases from a vantage point external to the doctrine: “It
is my belief that the myth of the Court as countermajoritarian savior is largely re-
sponsible for this gap in the literature. . . It is time for constitutional historians to
explode that myth, to identify and describe the parameters within which judicial
review actually operates, and to create a richer and more credible account of the
twentieth century’s civil rights and civil liberties revolutions.”).
40. Jess Bravin, Justice Kennedy Speaks Out on Gay Marriage, Shutdown, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 10, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230450040457912
5862192123886.
41. Id.
42. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
196 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 23:187
to evaluate sexual autonomy claims, when have tiers-of-scrutiny ever offered
certainty or cohesion?43 Lower courts and lawyers must express the law
within the boundaries set by precedent, and make some sense of the inco-
herent morass that is the space between the lines. Doctrine is far from the
final word on the constitutionality of incest prohibitions, but it is a fitting
starting point for that conversation.
This Article evaluates the constitutionality of criminalizing intimate
sexual relations between consenting adult parent-child and sibling couples.
Part I situates criminal incest legislation as the legal manifestation of a socio-
logical incest taboo as differentiated from the biological incest-avoidance
mechanism known as the Westermarck Effect. It suggests that incest legisla-
tion can operate as a counter-natural legal intervention that suppresses natu-
ral impulses produced by the phenomenon known as Genetic Sexual
Attraction. Part II asks whether incest falls within a constitutionally pro-
tected right. Part II(a) argues that the fundamental right to intimate sexual
conduct articulated by Lawrence must encompass incestuous relationships.
Incest cannot be meaningfully distinguished from same-sex sexual behavior.
Part II(b) asserts that the fundamental right to bear children would be im-
plicated by any law mandating the use of contraception by incestuous
couples. Part III casts doubt on the sufficiency of the various countervailing
state interests in criminalizing incestuous relationships. It evaluates govern-
ment interests in morality, family structure, child welfare, genetic health,
and the prevention of inherently coercive relationships. It argues that gov-
ernment interests in genetic health and coercion prevention are the strongest
rationales for criminal prohibition, but, not only are existing state statutes
poorly tailored to those interests, both theories pose considerable analytical
difficulties. Part III(f) suggests a more constitutionally robust justification
by casting incest as a Pandora’s Box of diffuse social harms. Destroying the
common nexus of a multiplicity of injuries becomes itself a compelling state
interest. It proposes revised statutory language that would allow states to
continue prohibiting sexual relationships between first-degree blood rela-
tives in a manner consistent with the constitution. The Article then con-
cludes by suggesting that doctrinal consistency may be too much to expect
from judges steeped in the incest taboo, but that this thought experiment is
nevertheless relevant as societal mores change.
43. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 945, 996 (2004) (“The venerable institution of tiered scrutiny is
threatened with collapse. As its structure has become ever more complicated, its
application has become increasingly unwieldy and uncertain . . . Deference to gov-
ernment judgment, once the exclusive hallmark of minimal scrutiny, now is an as-
pect of strict scrutiny, while minimal scrutiny sometimes lacks any deference to
governmental judgment.”).
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I. THE WESTERMARCK EFFECT AND GENETIC SEXUAL ATTRACTION
The very idea of a sexual relationship between two first-degree blood
relatives is unfathomable to many. Indeed, more states allow bestiality than
incest.44 Although states differ on whether sexual relationships between
cousins or non-blood relatives are considered incestuous, there are near-uni-
versal state prohibitions against parent-child and sibling relationships.45
Only a handful of outliers exist, and that pool has been shrinking since
2003. Ohio bans incestuous marriages, but only parental figures who en-
gage in sexual conduct with their children commit a crime.46 Rhode Island
also bans incestuous marriages, but consensual sex is legal.47 Rhode Island’s
permissiveness was until 2006 shared by South Dakota, which then passed a
44. At the moment, 13 states (Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming) have no law against bestiality. See Maria Turcios, Bestiality Laws: Our Dirty
Little Secret, HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2014), http://hastingswo
menslj.org/journal/2014/2/20/e3y5p9h4xformoldf658mebzcse7va. Alabama
criminalized bestiality in 2014 and New Jersey is in the process of doing so. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-221 (2014); S2296, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014).
45. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02 (2009) (Texas incest statute criminalizing
sexual intercourse between cousins, adopted or otherwise), with N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 5 (McKinney) (cousins permitted to marry in New York), and N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 255.25 (McKinney 2006) (cousins excluded from New York criminal incest
statute.). 20 states include adoptive relatives within their incest legislation, while 30
states and the District of Columbia do not. 46 states and D.C. criminalize sex be-
tween uncles or aunts and nephews or nieces, while 4 do not. 26 states bar first-
cousin marriages, while 17 states and D.C. permit them. Seven states permit first-
cousin marriages conditionally, usually on the condition that the couple is infertile
or otherwise will not have children. Only nine states criminalize sex between first-
cousins. These figures include Michigan and South Dakota. New Jersey’s statute is
not included because it has yet to be signed into law. See Cahill, supra note 9, at
1563-64 (Cahill summarizes the diverse statutory approaches among the states, but
since her article was first published South Dakota has banned incest and New Jersey
is about to. See text accompanying notes 38-46. Cahill also mistakenly included
Michigan along with Rhode Island as one of the states that permits consensual incest
whilst prohibiting marriage. In 1996, Michigan banned sex between relatives up to
the third degree, which includes first-cousins. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520e (2013).). See also National District Attorney’s Association, Statutory
Compilation Regarding Incest Statutes (2013) (This compilation is up-to-date as of
March 2013.).
46. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (2009).
47. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-1 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-2 (2014);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-3 (2014). Interestingly, otherwise prohibited mar-
riages between blood relatives are allowed if the partners are Jewish and follow relig-
ious precepts. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-4 (2014). Rhode Island’s criminal
incest statute was repealed in 1989. See Cahill, supra note 9, at 1564.
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criminal incest statute that also encompasses sex between first cousins.48 Un-
til 1979, New Jersey too possessed a criminal incest statute, but a new crim-
inal code enacted that year “left a section planned for incest blank.”49 On
January 15, 2015, New York Magazine published an interview online with
an anonymous 18 year old girl in a sexual relationship with her father. She
was separated from him as a child. The girl stated: “we plan to move to New
Jersey where we can be safe under the law, since adult incest isn’t illegal
there, and once I’m there I’ll tell everyone. I’ll call my mom and let her
know that we are in love and we are having children.” 50 In response, on
February 5, 2015, a bill criminalizing incest was introduced in the New
Jersey Assembly,51 followed 5 days later in the Senate.52
Social norms may have changed with regard to homosexuality, but the
incest taboo remains strong in America. This section summarizes the cur-
rent bio-social consensus on the origins of this taboo—is it nature or nur-
ture? In doing so, I conclude that neither the incest taboo, nor its derivative
legal expression, derives from natural biological imperatives; far from being
“natural,” criminal prohibitions on incest are “unnatural” efforts to improve
on nature.
For nearly a century, scholars drawing on a now outdated medical-
biological consensus that inbreeding does not have negative effects53 be-
lieved the incest taboo to be entirely a social construct. Claude Levi-Strauss
famously theorized that it evolved to discourage endogamy and encourage
exogamous inter-communal alliances.54 This “alliance theory” posits that
the taboo prevents kinship networks from mating within, forcing them to
exchange their women with other networks.55 In other words, the incest
taboo encourages the circulation of women between communities in order
48. Compare S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22A-2 (2014), with Cahill, supra note 9, at
1564.
49. Angelini Bill Would Ban Incest in New Jersey, NJ ASSEMBLY REPUBLICANS, Jan. 21,
2015, http://www.njassemblyrepublicans.com/?p=17649. New Jersey already prohib-
its incestuous marriages. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (2007).
50. Alexa Tsoulis-Reay, What It’s Like to Date Your Dad, SCIENCE OF US, Jan. 15, 2015,
http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2015/01/what-its-like-to-date-your-dad.html.
51. Assemb. B. 4150, 216th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
52. S. 2743, 216th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2014).
53. Leslie White, The Definition and Prohibition of Incest, 50 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLO-
GIST 416, 417 (1948) (“[I]nbreeding as such does not cause degeneration; the testi-
mony of biologists is conclusive on this point.”).
54. See, CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 42-51
(1969); see also JOSEPH SHEPHER, INCEST: A BIOSOCIAL VIEW 151-63 (1983) (sum-
marizing the progression of thinkers and arguments that comprise the “Alliance
School”).
55. Id.
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to build affinity, commodifying women for social advantage.56 The incest
taboo reifies hierarchies of class and gender considered highly problematic
in the 21st century. In the same constructivist vein, Sigmund Freud’s adher-
ents argued that the taboo is not only artifice, but counter-natural artifice.57
To Freud, it is a necessary source of social anxiety and sexual dysfunction
that forces us to repress our innate Oedipal tendencies.58 Our desires frus-
trated, the incest taboo allows us to maintain the social structure of the
family.59
Today, however, the development of modern genetics has proven
without a doubt that inbreeding can be biologically harmful.60 Conse-
quently, an increasing number of scholars believe that, contrary to at least
one jurist’s belief that “the taboo is neither instinctual nor biological,”61
humans are indeed hardwired to avoid inbreeding rather than are mere pris-
oners of artifice. 62 First posited by Finnish anthropologist Edward Wes-
termarck in 1891,63 what has been termed the “Westermarck Effect” is
comprised of three main hypotheses. William Durham64 describes them as
(1) “a lack of inclination for, and a feeling of aversion associated with the
idea of, sexual intercourse between persons who have lived in a long-contin-
56. Examples include the marital alliances formed between aristocratic families.
57. See SHEPHER, supra note 54, at 135-50 (summarizing the work of Freud and his
adherents, collectively referred to as the “Socialization School”); see also SIGMUND
FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (1950).
58. See SHEPHER, supra note 54, at 135-50.
59. Id.
60. See discussion infra Part III(c); see also Arthur P. Wolf, Introduction to INBREEDING,
INCEST, AND THE INCEST TABOO 1, 3 (Arthur P. Wolf & William H. Durham eds.,
2005) (“When Aberle et al. met at Stanford in 1956, they too appear to have taken
the position that inbreeding is not necessarily deleterious. But by the time they pub-
lished the results of their deliberations in 1963, they had changed their minds be-
cause of ‘new information’ ‘which appeared after the 1956 argument had been
developed’ . . . . This led to the published conclusion that ‘the biological advantages
of the familial incest taboo cannot be ignored.’ . . . . The present state of our knowl-
edge of the consequences of inbreeding is summarized in this volume by Alan H.
Bittles in Chapter 2. For Bittles the question is not whether inbreeding is injurious;
it is how injurious.”).
61. Benton v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202, 205 (Ga. 1995) (Sears, J., concurring).
62. See e.g., Debra Lieberman & Adam Smith, It’s All Relative: Sexual Aversion and Moral
Judgments Regarding Sex Among Siblings, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL.
SCI. 243, 246 (2012) (Discussion finding that people’s aversion toward their own
siblings “predict the intensity of moral judgments regarding sibling incest in gen-
eral,” suggesting that “psychological adaptations guiding personal sexual decisions
can color moral judgments about the behavior of other people.”).
63. See 2 EDWARD WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE (1922).
64. See William H. Durham, Assessing the Gaps in Westermarck’s Theory, in INBREEDING,
INCEST, AND THE INCEST TABOO 121, 122 (Arthur P. Wolf & William H. Durham
eds., 2005).
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ued intimate relationship.”65 (2) Aversion is an evolutionary adaptation
against the negative effects of inbreeding. (3) Aversion causes the incest ta-
boo, which expresses itself “in custom and law as a prohibition of intercourse
between near kin.”66 Westermarck was ignored in the early-20th century
when his theory seemed counter-factual. 67 Now, at least in the form of
aversion theory, the Westermarck Effect is hegemonic.68
But while the existence of sexual aversion between close childhood
associates is now established consensus,69 there is strong evidence against the
expression hypothesis. In other words, the incest taboo, and its legal mani-
festations, are not a causal product of instinctive biological impulses. For
one, expression theory is undermined by the diffuseness of norms. If the
taboo were biologically caused, then it should be universal and hew closely
to the subjects of the aversion effect—relationships between close childhood
companions. But the incest taboo is far from universal; in many cultures,
what Americans consider quintessential incest is not taboo, and may even be
65. 2 WESTERMARCK, supra note 63, at 198 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 193.
67. See, e.g., LORD RAGLAN, JOCASTA’S CRIME 16 (1933) (critiquing Westermarck’s the-
ory for assuming that incest is harmful “in the face of all the evidence”).
68. See, e.g., Durham, supra note 64, at 121 (“The skepticism and dismissal that plagued
Westermarck’s incest theory in the wake of early critiques by Sigmund Freud and Sir
James Frazer have given way to a recent groundswell of empirical validation and
approbation. Today, Westermarck’s theory is often held up as paradigmatic of cur-
rent understandings of the relationship between genes and culture in human evolu-
tion. Frans de Waal, for example, writes that the Westermarck effect—that is, the
absence of sexual interest between adults who were reared together as young chil-
dren—serves as ‘showcase’ of new Darwinian approaches to human behavior. Other
authors claim that sibling incest avoidance not only vindicates Westermarck but also
shows that ‘a tight and formal connection can be made between biological and cul-
tural change.’ And in his recent treatise on the unity of knowledge, E. O. Wilson
notes that Westermarck’s argument is, simply, ‘the current explanation’ of incest
avoidance.”).
69. Research on the Israeli Kibbutz and Sim-Pua Marriages in Taiwan constitute the
canonical studies confirming the Westermarck Effect. In both instances, there were
fewer marriages and higher rates of divorce than would have been expected had there
been no close childhood association between mates. In the instance of the Sim-Pua,
betrothed girls were raised by their in-laws alongside their future husbands. Thus,
there was not only no social taboo that would otherwise account for the results, but
in fact an opposite expectation of marriage. See ARTHUR P. WOLF, SEXUAL ATTRAC-
TION AND CHILDHOOD ASSOCIATION: A CHINESE BRIEF FOR EDWARD WES-
TERMARCK 198-213 (1995); SHEPHER, supra note 54, at 51-67. Nevertheless, the
Westermarck consensus is not without its dissenters. See Eran Shor & Dalit Simchai,
Exposing the Myth of Sexual Aversion in the Israeli Kibbutzim: A Challenge to the Wes-
termarck Hypothesis, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1509 (2012).
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encouraged.70 Egyptians married brother and sister. This practice was com-
mon among everyday people, not just the elite.71 In at least twenty Euro-
pean countries, consensual incest between adult siblings is legal.72 In some
European countries, the incest taboo in its legal form has unraveled or is
beginning to unravel. France legalized consensual incestuous conduct in
1811, Portugal in 1983, and Serbia in 2006. 73 In 2010, the Swiss upper-
house drafted a law decriminalizing incest, noting that there had been only
three cases since 1984 and they all involved children already protected by
laws against child abuse.74 But in terms of intensity of feeling, there was a
clear difference between those who favored and those who opposed
decriminalization; one MP said he saw nothing wrong with consensual in-
cest, while another retorted that “murder is also quite rare in Switzerland
but no one suggests that we remove that as an offense from the statutes.”75
In Germany, the recent case of Patrick Stübing and Susan Karolewski, a
sibling couple who had four children together, was appealed all the way to
the Federal Constitutional Court.76 Stübing was convicted under a statute
70. See e.g., ROBERT J. SMITH & ELLA LURY WISWELL, THE WOMEN OF SUYE MURA
68-72 (1982) (describing a pre-war Japanese rural practice of masturbating young
children to put them to sleep).
71. See e.g., Walter Scheidel, Brother-Sister Marriage in Roman Egypt, 29 J. BIOSOCIAL
SCI. 361 (1997) (Using Roman census records showing that 37% of marriages in the
city of Arsinoe were between full siblings, the author finds that reproduction could
not have occurred at replacement-levels.).
72. See Stübing v. Germany, App. No. 43547/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (“Out of thirty-
one Council of Europe Member States, sixteen States (Albania, Austria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, San Marino and Slovakia) the perform-
ance of consensual sexual acts between adult siblings is considered a criminal offence,
while in fifteen of them (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia
and Ukraine) it is not punishable under criminal law . . . and were not subject to
criminal liability in five further countries (France, the Netherlands, the Russian Fed-
eration, Spain and Turkey).”).
73. See Stübing v. Germany, App. No. 43547/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (“[I]ncest be-
tween adult siblings has been decriminalised in Portugal in 1983 and in Serbia in
2006.”); Max Planck Institute, Criminal Prohibition of Incest in International Legal
Comparison, in LIMITS ON THE PROTECTION OF LEGAL INTERESTS IN THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF INCEST (2015), https://www.mpicc.de/en/forschung/for-
schungsarbeit/gemeinsame_projekte/inzest/inzeststrafbarkeit.html (“The systems
without criminal incest provisions include France (in accordance with the Napole-
onic Code of 1811). . . .”).




76. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 392/07, Feb. 26, 2008, http://
www.bverfg.de/e/rs20080226_2bvr039207.html.
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barring vaginal sex between lineal ancestors and descendants, and between
full and half-siblings.77 The court commissioned a study by the Max Planck
Institute estimating the total prevalence of consensual sex between siblings
at 2-5% of the population, some 1.6 to 4 million Germans.78 Although the
court upheld the law, a ruling subsequently affirmed by the European Court
of Human Rights,79 Stübing sparked a heated debate on consensual adult
incest.80 The question was forwarded to the German Ethics Council, which
released a non-binding opinion that “consensual intercourse between adult
siblings should in future not be treated under criminal law.”81 Clearly the
incest artifice we observe and experience (“taboo”) does not map onto its
biological counterpart (“aversion”). But aversion itself is only crudely corre-
lated with inbreeding. It is over-inclusive in that not all children who grow
up together are blood-relatives. It is under-inclusive in that children who do
not grow up together might, of course, be blood-relatives. Aversion and
incest avoidance are thus not the same, and if law mirrored nature, law
would no longer be an incest prohibition but rather a prohibition against
sexual conduct between close childhood associates. Although expression the-
ory implies a cohesive and universal taboo matching our aversions, it turns
out that taboo, aversion, inbreeding, and the law overlap only loosely.82 As
we shall see in Part III, this poses particular challenges for the constitutional
tailoring doctrine.
77. StGB [Penal Code], § 173, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/
englisch_stgb.html.
78. See Incest in Criminology and Genetics, in Limits on the Protection of Legal Interests in
the Criminalization of Incest, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE (2015), https:/www.mpicc.de/
en/forchung/forschungsarbeit/gemeinsame_projekte/inzest_krim.html.
79. See Stübing v. Germany, App. No. 43547/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
80. See, e.g., Daniel Sokol, What’s So Wrong With Incest? The Case of Stübing v. Ger-
many, UK HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG (Apr. 15, 2012), http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/
2012/04/15/whats-so-wrong-with-incest-the-case-of-stubing-v-germany/.
81. Press Release, German Ethics Council, A Majority in the Ethics Council Recom-
mends a Revision to Section 173 of the German Criminal Code Regarding Consen-
sual Incest Between Siblings (Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with author).
82. See infra Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INCEST TABOO, AVERSION,
INBREEDING, AND LAW
Moreover, the incest taboo is likely not a product of nature because
the same evidence in favor of aversion being a biological adaptation simulta-
neously undermines the expression hypothesis. We know that aversion is
biological rather than social because the empirical support derives from
three different environments where there were “clear signs of the lack (or
decrease) of sexual attraction between childhood associates, although sexual
contacts between the individuals in question were not prohibited but even
encouraged.”83 But as Durham notes, if the expression hypothesis is correct,
then sexual aversion also should have produced a concurrent incest taboo.
The absence of the taboo in one study may be an outlier, but its absence
from all three studies done in vastly different communities (child socializa-
tion in Israeli kibbutzim, Taiwanese sim-pua marriages, and Lebanese ar-
ranged cousin marriages) militates against a causal connection. Of course
this is only dispositive against expression theory in that biology is not a
sufficient ingredient, but paired with the fact that the incest taboo is non-
universal, non-cohesive, and does not and cannot hew closely to its biologi-
83. Neven Sesardic, From Genes to Incest Taboos: The Crucial Step, in INBREEDING, IN-
CEST, AND THE INCEST TABOO, 109, 116 (Arthur P. Wolf & William H. Durham
eds., 2005).
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cal roots, it seems unlikely that the taboo is merely an expression of our
biology.
Due to this disjunction, biological and sociological explanations for
the incest taboo are now locked in an uneasy coexistence. Incest legislation
builds on only one of two different but overlapping phenomena, the first
social (“taboo”) and the second biological (“aversion”). Law is a manifesta-
tion of taboo; consequently, social justifications for criminalization—moral-
ity or protection of the family unit—are actually self-perpetuating. Via
exclusion of non-normative family structuring we strengthen preexisting so-
cial norms, and increase the cost of violating those norms. Meanwhile, pub-
lic-health rationales recast criminal prohibitions as a man-made prophylactic
against inbreeding operating parallel to and independent of biological aver-
sion. Some of these manmade prophylactics work better. Laws tailored to
encompass only real blood relatives have improved on the state of nature.
There is nothing inherently “natural” about incest legislation.
In fact, Genetic Sexual Attraction (“GSA”) suggests that incest laws
are counter-natural. GSA refers to the strong attraction felt by blood rela-
tives reunited after being separated as children. A phenomenon that has
attracted only a scattering of scholarly attention so far,84 the name was
coined in the late 1980s by Barbara Gonyo, the founder of a support group
for adoptees reunited with blood relatives.85 Post-adoption agencies are fa-
miliar with GSA, and the present consensus is that it occurs in approxi-
mately 50% of all reunions.86 This high percentage rate reinforces the
limited evidence we have suggesting that the absolute number of GSA cases
is not negligible. We do not know how many adoptees search for their bio-
logical family,87 but the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics has
84. See, e.g., Maurice Greenberg & Roland Littlewood, Post-Adoption Incest and Pheno-
typic Matching: Experience, Personal Meanings, and Biosocial Implications, 68 BRIT. J.
MED. PSYCH. 29 (1995).
85. See BARBARA GONYO, I’M HIS MOTHER BUT HE’S NOT MY SON (2011) (ebook);
Alex Kirsta, Genetic Sexual Attraction, GUARDIAN, May 16, 2003, http://
www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2003/may/17/weekend7.weekend.
86. See Greenberg & Littlewood, supra note 84, at 35 n.2; Kirsta, supra note 85.
87. See Marshall D. Schechter & Doris Bertocci, The Meaning of Search, in THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 62, 67 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter
eds., 1990) (“The question is often raised as to the prevalence in the total adoptee
population of search interest and search behavior. (Search ideation must be distin-
guished from activated search, which may or may not follow.) However, with refer-
ence to the United States, not even remote numerical estimates are possible for either
category. This is in part because, according to the Department of Health and
Human Services in Washington, D.C., since 1971, no national statistics have been
compiled on the numbers of legally adopted persons in any age group . . . . The
studies from Great Britain, where adults have legal access to original birth certifi-
cates, indicate that less than 1% of eligible adoptees have availed themselves of the
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projected that roughly a third of those in the UK will eventually request
their birth records.88 In the age of social media, this likely underestimates
the search rate. Additionally, familial reunions from those raised in divorced
and single-parent homes further swell the number of those who may experi-
ence GSA. With exceptions, lurid tabloid stories outing incestuous relation-
ships often involve blood relatives separated at a young age,89 and nearly all
of the real-life examples of consensual adult incest found in the course of
researching this Article (and cited within) are examples of GSA.90 This tab-
loid sampling likely reflects the distribution of consensual adult incest in the
First World. On the one hand, incest is taboo regardless of explanation, so
those who experience GSA are no less likely to share their stories. On the
other hand, non-GSA relationships would be rarer due to the Westermarck
Effect. Freud’s Oedipus Complex has returned with a vengeance, this time
armed with empirical evidence.
Incest elicits from most of us an intuitive revulsion that we are
tempted to justify in the language of natural versus unnatural. The Court
has rationalized legal decisions with reference to this dichotomy in the re-
cent past. In 1989, it ruled that a father has no due process right to pater-
nity of and visitation with his biological child. 91 Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion observed that “California law, like nature itself, makes no provision
for dual fatherhood.”92 But in the context of incest at least, the natural/
unnatural distinction is unsound. Incest laws can only be understood as an
effort to socially and genetically engineer society, and human beings, to be
better than what we find in nature. It is important to emphasize that the
creation of artifice alone does not render legislation constitutionally suspect.
Hobbes would remind us that the very purpose of law is to transcend the
natural state. But if we accept the validity of alliance theory, an approach
that retains considerable weight in the academy, then the social rationales
open record within any given year. In a recent essay, Triseliotis (1984) suggests that a
more meaningful figure would be the proportion of adoptees who search over the
course of their lifetime which, by his calculations, would raise the figure to about
15%. In any event, one cannot reasonably assume a direct applicability from Scot-
land to the United States. American adoptees who have joined search organizations
number in the tens of thousands . . . . It is impossible to know the numbers of
adoptees searching independently.”) (citations omitted).
88. Rupert Rushbrooke, The Proportion of Adoptees Who Have Received Their Birth
Records in England and Wales, 104 POPULATION TRENDS 26, 30 (2001).
89. See, e.g., Roya Nikkhah, Grandmother and Grandson to Have Child Together, TELE-
GRAPH, May 1, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/
7662232/Grandmother-and-grandson-to-have-child-together.html.
90. The only exception is the case of Professor David Epstein, and Czech twin brothers
Elijah and Milo Peters.
91. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
92. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118. (Scalia, J., plurality).
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undergirding criminal prohibition become normatively dubious in that they
are inherently inequitable; we no longer think it acceptable to build social
kinship by exchanging women like chattel.
II. THE RIGHTS . . .
A. Autonomy of Intimate Sexual Conduct
In recent years, the legal manifestations of the incest taboo have come
to rest on constitutional quicksand. In 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Su-
preme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick and recognized a right to sex-
ual intimacy that protects the private sexual conduct of homosexual
couples.93 Careful examination of Lawrence’s reasoning reveals that sexual
intimacy must also encompass sexual relationships between first-degree rela-
tives. Of course, Bowers casts a lengthy shadow from beyond the grave. Law-
rence was decided in 2003, a time when community norms had shifted in
favor of increasing tolerance toward and indeed affirmative acceptance of
LGBTQ rights.94 The incest taboo has experienced no comparable erosion
in the United States. At the moment, legalized incest remains beyond the
comprehension of a public that finds it repugnant. Judges confronted with
the question would likely seize the first opportunity to differentiate incest
from homosexuality. Yet such efforts face considerable doctrinal obstacles.
First, this section argues that Obergefell and Lawrence foreclose the possibil-
ity of manipulating the generality of the constitutional right—for example,
by narrowing sexual intimacy into same-sex intimacy—so as to omit incest.
Second, “incestuous couples” cannot be distinguished meaningfully from
homosexual couples via the equal protection elements of Lawrence’s reason-
ing; sexual intimacy protects the freedom to choose one’s sexual partners
even absent an immutable “incestuous persons” identity group. Third, sex-
ual intimacy is a “fundamental right” subject to strict scrutiny.
1. Defining the Right
Before Obergefell, courts could ensure a troublesome plaintiff’s defeat
by manipulating the generality of the rights claimed. When homosexuality
93. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.
Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
94. Over 50% of Americans favored anti-sodomy laws in 1986, while in 2003 during
the run-up to the Lawrence decision, over 50% of Americans thought that sodomy
should be legal. See ANDREW R. FLORES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, NATIONAL
TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON LGBTQ RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 18
(2014).
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was considered by many to be just as repulsive and alien as incest, the Bow-
ers court avoided decades of case-law securing privacy interests attached to
bedroom activities by restating the right claimed by the plaintiff with ex-
traordinary specificity; it was not that the intimacies of the body and the
private home had been overpowered by a sodomy prohibition narrowly tai-
lored to a compelling state interest, but rather that the constitution did not
recognize a “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.” 95
Rights are no longer so elastic. Although we cannot divine the Court’s
future consistency, Obergefell now binds us to applying rights at the level of
generality articulated by the precedents establishing those rights. Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy refused to narrow the right at issue in
Obergefell from the “right to marry,” recognized since Loving v. Virginia,
into a “new and nonexistent ‘right to same-sex marriage.’ ”96 This stands in
some tension with Washington v. Glucksberg’s call for a “careful description”
of fundamental rights. 97 But, as Michael Dorf and Laurence Tribe distin-
guished in their amicus brief, whereas same-sex couples seeking to marry fell
within an established fundamental right, the right to physician-assisted
death claimed by the Glucksberg plaintiffs was instead encompassed within a
right to suicide unprecedented in the legal canon.98 Justice Kennedy agreed:
Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause
must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central
reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach
may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved
(physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach
this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, in-
cluding marriage and intimacy.99
95. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
96. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
97. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
98. Brief for Laurence Tribe & Michael Dorf, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
2-3, Obergefell, 135 U.S. 2584 (No. 14-556) (citations omitted) (“Some defenders of
state same-sex marriage bans contend that this Court changed its analysis of funda-
mental rights in Washington v. Glucksberg, and mandated a very narrow delineation
of the fundamental right claimed to be at issue in any given case. But in Glucksberg,
which declined to categorically invalidate state laws prohibiting assisted suicide, the
Court found no fundamental right to commit suicide comparable to the right to
marry, and then went on to find no reason to permit persons to assist others in
committing suicide.”).
99. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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Instead, the Court decided, a right must be as narrow or as wide as prior
cases specify. Future deployment of a right cannot be limited only to the
particular contexts of its past usage:
Loving did not ask about a “right to interracial marriage”; Turner
did not ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki
did not ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid child support
duties to marry.” Rather, each case inquired about the right to
marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient
justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.100
Obergefell thus repudiated Justice Scalia’s suggestion, in footnote 6 of the
Michael H. v. Gerald D. plurality, that a fundamental right should be de-
fined at “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”101 When foot-
note 6 was written in 1989, it was joined only by Justice Rehnquist. Justice
O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote a separate concurrence oppos-
ing such a restrictive analytical approach:
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalia’s opinion. This
footnote sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when
identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be somewhat inconsis-
tent with our past decisions in this area. On occasion the Court
has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at
levels of generality that might not be “the most specific level”
available. I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior
imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.102
The concerns expressed in the rejoinder were echoed by many in the acad-
emy,103 and Obergefell allowed Justice Kennedy the opportunity to refine his
100. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
101. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality).
102. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
103. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1613, 1615 (1990) (“His test assumes that constitutionally protected
liberties match or do not match existing traditions in an unproblematic way. For
each asserted right there either is or is not a specific tradition associated with its
protection. Yet there are many different ways of describing a liberty, and many dif-
ferent ways of characterizing a tradition. For example, we might point out that under
his test, there has been no established tradition in California for protecting Justice
Scalia’s own rights to visit his children, since there is no tradition of affording pro-
tection to fathers who are children of Italian immigrants and who graduated from
Ivy League law schools before 1965, were appointed to the United States Supreme
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three-decades-old reservations about Footnote 6 into the Court’s first clear
pronouncement on the generality of rights to command a majority of votes.
With Obergefell, Justice O’Connor’s Michael H. concurrence is now indis-
putably the law of the land.
Under Obergefell’s generality guidelines, to characterize Lawrence as a
case about autonomy of same-sex intimacy rather than autonomy of sexual
intimacy is to commit the same mistake the Bowers majority did. As Tribe,
who argued Bowers on behalf of Michael Hardwick, observed, “the Georgia
statute [in Bowers]—which was challenged on its face—criminalizes all oral
and anal sexual contact, whether homosexual or heterosexual, married or
unmarried . . . the gravamen of Hardwick’s offense was the physical act he
performed, not the gender of the person with whom he performed it.”104
The four Bowers dissenters agreed,105 and by overturning Bowers, Lawrence
vindicated the view that the particular right at stake hinged on the inherent
intimacy of sexual relationships and not on the identity or sexuality of the
persons involved. Unlike the facially neutral Georgia statute in Bowers, the
Texas statute challenged in Lawrence criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse
with another individual of the same sex.” 106 In her concurrence, Justice
O’Connor seized on this distinction, arguing that the Texas statute was in-
valid under the Equal Protection Clause as an instance of impermissible
animus. 107 It was a vain attempt to save Bowers; “I joined Bowers, and do
Court by former governors of the state of California and have more than two chil-
dren but less than thirteen. Indeed, the question has hardly ever come up. Justice
Scalia would no doubt have responded that these are the wrong factors to consider in
matching liberty to tradition. And we might reply: How do you, oh purveyor of
neutral principles, know this?”); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of
Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1085-1098 (1990)
(critiquing Footnote 6’s devotion to tradition and specificity as an invitation to arbi-
trary decision making).
104. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1431 (2d ed.
1988).
105. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s almost obsessive focus on
homosexual activity is particularly hard to justify in light of the broad language
Georgia has used. Unlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on
the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives
may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of
those other citizens.”).
106. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (“We have
consistently held, however, that some objectives, such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state interests. When a law exhibits
such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more search-
ing form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection
Clause.”).
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not join the Court in overruling it.”108 If Texas’ unequal treatment of ho-
mosexual and heterosexual sodomy were the crux of the decision, Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence would have controlled.
Instead, the Lawrence majority held that “Bowers was not correct when
it was decided, and it is not correct today.” Rather than sexual orientation,
Lawrence was premised on an “emerging recognition that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”109 The Court reaffirmed that the liberty
inherent in the Due Process Clause protects matters—
—involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, choices central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.110
A person’s sexual and romantic relationships are surely among these deeply
private matters central to that individual’s identity. As Justice Scalia sug-
gested in his dissent, it would be difficult to exclude consensual adult incest
from such a broadly articulated principle.111 Lawrence clarified that liberty is
not derivative of physical locality. 112 Intimate acts are constitutionally pro-
tected because such conduct is integral to self-definition regardless of where
it occurs; the freedom to choose one’s own life path cannot be intruded
upon without compelling cause. The Court emphasized that this self-defini-
tional liberty first recognized in Griswold would mean little if it did not
protect “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most
private of places, the home. [Sodomy prohibitions] do seek to control a
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in
the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
108. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
109. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (majority opinion).
110. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
111. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (majority opinion) (“[T]here are other spheres of our
lives and existence, outside the home, where the state should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its
more transcendent dimensions.”).
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criminals.”113 The freedom to pursue a sexual relationship, Justice Kennedy
continued, “should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury
to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”114
Distilled, Lawrence establishes autonomy to decide in matters of sexual
and relational intimacy, a right that is inclusive of but not exclusive to same-
sex relationships and conduct. Lawrence pegged the proper generality level
of the right for us. “Sexual behavior” with a family member is still “sexual
behavior,” and the enforcement of criminal incest laws invokes the same
concerns that animated both Justice Douglas in Griswold and Justice Ken-
nedy in Lawrence: the state barging into a private bedroom (“the most pri-
vate of places”) to police consensual sexual relationships (“the most private
human conduct”).115
The sense of intrusion underlying Griswold and literally played out by
the facts of Lawrence does not suddenly evaporate in regards to criminal
incest legislation. It would be arbitrary to restrict sexual liberty to same-sex
relationships merely because Lawrence invoked the right specifically in re-
gards to a statute policing same-sex conduct. As Justice Kennedy remarked
in Obergefell, “If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then
received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new
groups could not invoke rights once denied.”116 Bowers would still be law.
Instead, just as Obergefell “inquired about the right to marry in its compre-
hensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the
relevant class from the right,”117 jurists are obligated to do the same for the
right to sexual intimacy.
2. The Equal Dignity Doctrine
So what exactly does “sexual intimacy” encompass? One might be
tempted to differentiate incest from same-sex relationships by emphasizing
choice of partner. Lawrence’s holding secured individual freedom to engage
in consensual adult sexual relationships, but partner choice may yet be tied
to identity politics. In the equal-protection context at least, identity attribu-
tion has become the primary mode of claims-making,118 and the LGBTQ
113. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
114. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
115. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
116. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
117. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
118. See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860,
1883 (1987) (“Even this usual conception of rights, premised on autonomy, relies on
a social and communal construction of boundaries among people. Boundaries,
whether social, psychological, or legal, do not exist naturally; they are invented and
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rights movement has pursued a general legal strategy that makes much of
like-race arguments.119 Tribe notes that an individual’s freedom of action is
only ancillary to the Lawrence holding.120 Rather, Lawrence ensured that one
person’s chosen sexual relationship with another will be treated by the state
with the same dignity and respect as other sexual relationships.121 The right
to “sexual intimacy,” then, is as much derived from principles of equality as
it is from liberty and privacy:
Lawrence, more than any other decision in the Supreme Court’s
history, both presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-
based and relationally situated theory of substantive liberty. The
‘liberty’ of which the Court spoke was as much about equal dig-
nity and respect as it was about freedom of action—more so, in
fact. And the Court left no doubt that it was protecting the
equal liberty and dignity not of atomistic individuals torn from
their social contexts, but of people as they relate to, and interact
with, one another.122
Thus, while Lawrence was built on the due process clause, its equality impli-
cations cannot be ignored. 123 By criminalizing what was commonly viewed
as quintessentially “homosexual” activity, even when engaged in by oppo-
site-sex couples, Texas attached a stigma to same-sex relationships that “de-
means the lives of homosexual persons” and detracts from their dignity as
individuals.124
reinvented by people in formal and informal ways. As a psychological matter, the
very experience of a bounded personal identity requires not just one individual, but
many who help constitute the boundaries. In the words of one theorist, autonomy is
a process of ‘parts that mutually specify themselves,’ like M.C. Escher’s drawing of
two hands, drawing each other.”).
119. See Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Represen-
tation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115 (David Kairys ed.,
1998).
120. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. This is especially true in light of Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03
(2015) (“The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in
a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in
liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are
not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to
capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as
the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.”).
124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
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Although ultimately unpersuasive, a state could distinguish between
homosexuality and incest by asserting that, in the case of incest, there is no
immutable identity that is being demeaned. The current scientific consensus
is that homosexuality is in part biologically intrinsic and encoded in our
DNA.125 Thus, as states could potentially argue, there are no “incestuous
persons” like there are “homosexual persons.” Banning incest is to deny
heterosexuals and LGBTQs a very circumscribed set of partners in a manner
applicable to everyone, regardless of orientation. Sexual autonomy is indeed
protected, the state would concede, but a law restricting our freedom to
enter into sexual relations with our parents and siblings, yet giving us free
choice as to the remaining 7 billion on the planet, is only a de minimis
burden on liberty if a burden at all. Since society does not recognize “inces-
tuous persons” as a category akin to “homosexual persons,” or “women,” or
“African-Americans,” incest is outside the sexual autonomy umbrella.
Though his freedom of action is slightly reduced, the dignity of a white
heterosexual male is not impinged when the state prohibits him from sleep-
ing with his sister.
Such reasoning does not survive close examination. To begin, GSA
provides a group of people potentially identifiable ex ante who are particu-
larly and specifically burdened by incest legislation. Criminal prohibition
sends a message to those who experience GSA that their natural, biological
reactions to meeting a long-lost relative are morally repugnant. These are
not feelings they opt into, or can easily opt out of. Falling madly in love
with a family member is not something they chose, and criminalization not
only demeans the relationships that result, but also the individual who must
now ask “what is wrong with me?” GSA is, of course, not a disability and
should not be so stigmatized. It is a biological reaction innate in greater or
lesser degree to all of us triggered by a particular social context.126 Adoptees
and children from divorced households are not a suspect class, but one need
not belong to a suspect class to be treated unequally by the state.
Privacy and liberty cannot be a function of the immutability of the
burdened identity association, nor is an immutable identity association a
prerequisite for Fourteenth Amendment protection. If Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey had been decided solely on the basis of gender discrimina-
125. Of course, it must be noted that “in part” includes much dissensus. See, e.g., Barbara
L. Frankowski, Sexual Orientation and Adolescents, 113 PEDIATRICS 1827, 1828
(2004) (“Sexual orientation probably is not determined by any one factor but by a
combination of genetic, hormonal, and environmental influences. In recent decades,
biologically based theories have been favored by experts. The high concordance of
homosexuality among monozygotic twins and the clustering of homosexuality in
family pedigrees support biological models.”).
126. See supra Part I.
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tion,127 abortion before the point of viability would receive only intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Eisenstadt v. Baird invalidated a Massachusetts statute barring
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals under the Equal
Protection Clause because the statute mandated “dissimilar treatment for
married and unmarried persons” in regards to their fundamental right to
“decide whether to bear or beget children.” 128 It would be strange indeed to
interpret Eisenstadt to elevate bachelordom to a suspect status alongside race
or gender. Instead, Eisenstadt stood for the principle that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause compels the government to treat all persons equally in their
exercise of a fundamental right. Kenji Yoshino has proposed that this dig-
nity-based approach to equality, characterized by Tribe as a “double helix of
Due Process and Equal Protection” tightly wound “into a doctrine of equal
dignity,”129 adapts to public anxiety over increasing pluralization by dodg-
ing a judge-led inquiry into the validity of an asserted identity grouping. 130
Thus, unlike the Court’s traditional suspect-class jurisprudence, the equal
dignity doctrine avoids Balkanizing the American social fabric in the wake
of the heightened awareness and proliferation of identity politics over the
past few decades.131 It does so by circumventing the “suspect class” as an
instrument of constitutional analysis.
This conceptual turn was integral to Lawrence, where the Court invali-
dated Texas’ anti-sodomy statute because the law demeaned the dignity of
same-sex vis-à-vis heterosexual couples,132 even though the Court had never
expressly admitted sexual orientation into the traditional suspect-class classi-
127. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding
that a state can only regulate abortions if the regulation does not pose an “undue
burden” on the woman’s fundamental right to choose whether to bear or beget a
child).
128. 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
129. See Laurence Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17
(2015) (“Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the
double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”);
see also Tribe, supra note 120, at 1898.
130. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751-87
(2011) (describing the rise of pluralism anxiety in the United States, and the Court’s
reaction to that anxiety by denying constitutional protection to new groups under
the Equal Protection Clause, whilst compensating for the resultant civil-rights deficit
by expanding the reach of the Due Process Clause).
131. Id. at 787-802 (arguing that the shift from traditional group-based equality to a
dignity-based liberty-equality fusion is a desirable process that quiets pluralism anxi-
ety and maintains social unity).
132. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation
to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the pri-
vate spheres.”).
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fication scheme.133 Indeed, the equal dignity doctrine is firmly entrenched
in nearly a century of case-law.134 In 1942, the Court held in Skinner v.
Oklahoma that the mandatory sterilization of blue-collar but not white-col-
lar criminals violated Equal Protection by imposing an unequal burden on
the fundamental right to procreate, “one of the basic civil rights of man.”135
Twenty-five years later, the Court declared anti-miscegenation laws uncon-
stitutional under both Equal Protection and Due Process, writing:
[t]o deny this fundamental freedom [to marry] on so unsupport-
able a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these stat-
utes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of
law.136
And in Obergefell, the exclusion of lawful intimate relationships from the
fundamental right to marry recognized in Loving offended both Due Process
and Equal Protection.137 With the exception of Loving, none of these cases
involved one of the traditional suspect classes.
133. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (holding that a Colorado state consti-
tutional amendment fails even rational basis review because it deprives citizens of
equal protection of the laws “in the most literal sense,” without specifying whether
same-sex couples constitute a suspect class).
134. The liberty-equality synthesis at work in Obergefell is the same principle that
animated the forbearers of the privacy doctrine. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584, 2602-04 (2015) (“The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent princi-
ples. . . . Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recog-
nized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality
within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchal-
lenged. . . . Here the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence une-
qual . . . . [T]his denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm. . . . And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause,
prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.”) (cita-
tions omitted), with United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4
(1938) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)—which invalidated state laws targeting German lan-
guage education and Catholic schools, respectively, under the fundamental Due Pro-
cess right to “establish a home and bring up children,” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399—as
exemplifying heightened scrutiny for “statutes directed at particular religious, or na-
tional, or racial minorities” (citations omitted)).
135. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
136. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
137. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2604 (emphasis added) (“These considerations lead to the
conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of
the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
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Under the equal dignity framework, inequality arises whenever a per-
son’s sexual relationship with another is criminalized. Criminalization by
kind necessarily demeans the dignity of those who wish to pursue sexual
relationships of that kind. The very fact of illegality is a scarlet letter brand-
ing not only couples pursuing such relationships in secret, but also those
who harbor such desires, by reducing their sexual and romantic feelings to
the status of a perversion. Absent appropriately tailored countervailing inter-
ests, such a state-imposed stigma is exactly what Lawrence deemed
impermissible:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand re-
spect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of lib-
erty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter
point advances both interests. If protected conduct is made crim-
inal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its sub-
stantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not
enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons . . . . The
stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial.138
By pronouncing someone a pervert because of their sexual preference for the
same sex, or for a particular sex act, or because they are in love with a blood
relative, is to diminish the dignity of that person’s existence. In that sense, a
law restricting who we can romantically associate with is more invidious an
intrusion into the bedroom than a law restricting specific sexual conducts.
The latter implicates only our freedom of action, where the former impinges
on our existence as whole and equal members of society.
Lawrence did not explicitly say that the liberty of “intimate conduct”
implies a freedom to choose with whom we engage in that conduct, but it
does assert a generic right to “choose without being punished as
criminals.”139 This choice would be meaningless if it did not also encom-
pass, subject to the harm principle, the liberty to select our romantic com-
panions. Relational dignity is as much a concern in incestuous relationships
as it is in same-sex relationships. The sexual and feminist revolution has
created a world in which we are free to initiate a sexual relationship with
whomever we like. Notably, the companionate marriage apparatus,140 for all
teenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and
that liberty.”).
138. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
140. See Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”; Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L. J. 2117 (1996) (describing the 19th century transition from domestic law struc-
tured to preserve the early-modern household, to a companionate marriage model
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its flaws, rests on the assumption that our sexual partnerships are no longer
chosen for us by, and in the interests of, our kin groups.141 Even if we feel
no desire whatsoever for much of the population, and most of us feel no
desire for our family members, the availability of choice is itself a value that
must be considered. If, as Louis Brandeis once mused, the constitutional
privacy principle is “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men,”142 it would be doctri-
nally nonsensical to hinge the rights sheltered under the privacy umbrella on
whether an identity group has been burdened. A heterosexual white male
criminally punished for possessing and viewing pornography seized in a
warrantless search of his bedroom has suffered no less an injury, indeed the
same injury, as if he had been a homosexual woman of color. 143 Patrick
Stübing, deeply in love with his sister Susan Karolewski, served a jail term
for their relational preferences. If criminal punishment demeans the dignity
of a same-sex relationship, there is no reason why it does not similarly de-
mean the dignity of an incestuous relationship.
While it must be acknowledged that our pool of permissible sexual
partners spans the world, reduced only by the members of our family, if
sexual intimacy is the right to have one’s chosen relationship be treated with
equal dignity as the relationship choice of another, then range and quantity
of choice becomes irrelevant as to whether sexual intimacy has been in-
fringed. In striking down Pennsylvania’s partner notification requirement as
an undue burden on the right to abortion, the Casey majority defined the
relevant denominator not as the pool of all women, but rather the subset of
women who would be reluctant to notify their partners.144 In the same vein,
that increases women’s autonomy while simultaneously subjugating them through
other means).
141. If one is persuaded by Levi-Strauss’ Alliance Theory, that the incest taboo exists to
create a circulation of women meant to promote exogamous kinship networks, then
legal enforcement is antithetical both to the companionate marriage model of do-
mestic law, and also the autonomy principle that underpins the due process privacy
doctrine.
142. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
143. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the prosecution of a
heterosexual white male for the possession of obscene material discovered in a war-
rantless search of the bedroom violates a right to privacy protected by the interaction
between the 1st Amendment and the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause. As in
Lawrence, the Majority did not address the unreasonable search and seizure issue).
144. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894-95 (1992) (“Respon-
dents attempt to avoid the conclusion that § 3209 is invalid by pointing out that it
imposes almost no burden at all for the vast majority of women seeking abor-
tions. . . . We disagree with respondents’ basic method of analysis. The analysis does
not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins
there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on
those whose conduct it affects. . . . The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the
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while most sexual relationships are unaffected by criminal incest laws, the
relevant pool of burdened individuals is those who prefer a sexual relation-
ship with a family member. Elijah and Milo Peters are Czech twins who
perform together in pornographic videos:
‘My brother is my boyfriend, and I am his boyfriend . . . He is
my lifeblood, and he is my only love’ . . . . According to the back
story being sold by the twins and the studio, it’s not just about
the money for Elijah and Milo: They are two brothers engaged
in a real-life romantic relationship, and are simply showing it off
on-screen for the enjoyment of viewers. According to them, they
live their lives together as a couple, and only have sex with each
other (and nobody else) in their private lives.145
For many, Elijah and Milo included, our romantic preferences are not fun-
gible. It does not matter to a couple that the law leaves them a limitless pool
of alternatives if the only foreclosed option is the partner they most desire.
Restricting choice of partners restricts self-definition and detracts from
equal dignity.
3. Standard of Review
This is not to say that criminal prohibition is necessarily unconstitu-
tional. Including incestuous couples in the right to sexual intimacy merely
shifts the inquiry toward the societal imperatives that might be weighed
against personal rights. Recall Lawrence’s commitment to John Stuart Mills’
harm principle: an individual’s right to make the most intimate and per-
sonal decisions free from state compulsion exists only “absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”146 Central to the puzzle,
then, is determining the nature of the balancing test to be applied in a
sexual intimacy claim. Commentators and lower courts have suggested eve-
rything from strict scrutiny,147 to rational basis review,148 to something in
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant.”).
145. Thomas Rogers, Gay Porn’s Most Shocking Taboo, SALON, May 20, 2010, http://
www.salon.com/2010/05/21/twincest/.
146. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)
147. See e.g., Tribe, supra note 120, at 1917 n.82 (“In Griswold, too, no ‘standard’ was
announced by the Court, but what we would today call ‘strict scrutiny’ was plainly
at work.”).
148. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817
(11th Cir. 2004) (“Most significant, however, is the fact that the Lawrence
Court . . . invalidated the Texas statute on rational-basis grounds . . . .”).
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between,149 to something entirely different.150 Underscoring Justice Ken-
nedy’s reluctance to pronounce a new fundamental right, Lawrence was de-
liberately vague. Nevertheless, strict scrutiny is the only possible
interpretation of Lawrence’s holding, and as of Obergefell, Justice Kennedy
too, has resigned himself to the reality that Lawrence acknowledged a funda-
mental right to autonomy of intimate sexual conduct.151
Let us first eliminate alternative readings of Lawrence. One interpreta-
tion is that the Court was attempting to distance itself from tiers of scrutiny
altogether.152 The tiers model has been questioned by, amongst others, Jus-
tices Marshall and Stevens,153 and its structure has already been eroded by
the application of more stringent rational-basis review in cases of suspected
animus.154 Such revision has its appeal. It would relieve judges of the re-
149. See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We
therefore conclude that Lawrence applied something more than traditional rational
basis review. . . . However, we hesitate to apply strict scrutiny when the Supreme
Court did not discuss narrow tailoring or a compelling state interest in Lawrence,
and we do not address the issue here.”).
150. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Anatomy, Desuetude, Sexu-
ality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 (2003) (suggesting the right to
sexual intimacy is a desuetude doctrine operating parallel to the traditional rights-
harm balancing test).
151. See infra, text accompanying note 178.
152. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1104
(2004) (“I see Lawrence as marking the emergence of a new approach to substantive
due process analysis, one that has been simmering in the concurring opinions of
Justices Souter, Stevens, and Kennedy for the last decade. These three Justices appar-
ently now have a majority for extending meaningful constitutional protection to
liberty interests without denominating them as fundamental rights.”); Peter S.
Smith, Note, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court
Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence? 23 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 475 (1997).
153. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“I have never been persuaded that these so-called ‘standards’ adequately
explain the decisional process.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“I must once
more voice my disagreement with the Court’s rigidified approach to equal protection
analysis. The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases
fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of re-
view—strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court’s decisions in the field of
equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this
Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
154. See e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580-83 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(summarizing the case law on a more rigorous rational basis standard when there is
evidence of animus); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)
(striking down a law under rational basis review because its purpose was to “discrimi-
nate against hippies”).
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sponsibility of ranking our rights. Justice Marshall preferred “an approach in
which ‘concentration [is] placed upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the as-
serted state interests in support of the classification.’ ”155 As the Court’s cur-
rent swing vote, Justice Kennedy’s apparent disinclination toward the
traditional model may be a glimpse of the future. Notably, Justices Ken-
nedy, O’Connor, and Souter’s majority opinion in Casey created a new test
for abortion that strikes down laws posing an “undue burden” for women
seeking abortions before viability. 156 Casey weighed the character of the
right, the burden imposed by the specific circumscription of that right, and
the importance of the asserted state interests.157 Lawrence, in turn, relied
heavily on Casey for the idea that the majority may not use the state to
enforce its moral views on society; “[o]ur obligation,” Justice Kennedy
quotes, “is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.”158 In that vein, Justice Kennedy’s silence on the applicable scrutiny
level may allow a future Court confronted with the Incest Horrible to devise
its own test, extend Casey’s balancing approach, or to leave the legal stan-
dard in its current state of ambiguity.
The Court, however, has always been wary of disrupting longstanding
doctrinal frameworks.159 It is more reasonable to interpret Lawrence’s silence
to mean that the Justices were undecided at the time on whether sexual
intimacy is fundamental, rather than as abandonment of the tiers apparatus.
Obergefell may have abrogated Glucksburg by untethering the recognition of
a fundamental right from the dead hand of historical practice,160 but
155. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (“Only where
state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
157. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
158. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.).
159. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . [W]hy are you asking us to
overrule 150, 140 years of prior law . . . when you can reach your result under
substantive due [process?] . . . [W]hat you argue is the darling of the professoriate,
for sure, but it’s also contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence. Why do you want
to undertake that burden instead of just arguing substantive due process? Which, as
much as I think it’s wrong, . . . even I have acquiesced in it.”).
160. Compare Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (“[T]he Court has
regularly observed that the Clause specifically protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition.”)
(citation omitted), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2602 (“If rights were
defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as
their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once de-
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Obergefell also reaffirmed the strict scrutiny standard by situating same-sex
relationships within the fundamental right to marry.161 In pushing the sub-
stantive frontiers of the Due Process Clause, Justice Kennedy has “exer-
cise[d] the utmost care” by leaving the standard open for debate and further
development by scholars, lower courts, and future Supreme Court deci-
sions.162 This does not necessarily evince his intent to discard the existing
analytical framework, only his commitment to prudent caution and exhaus-
tive experimentation before incorporating doctrinal innovations into settled
law. Even as a trailblazer of a legal gay-rights revolution, Justice Kennedy
used eighteen years to mold the jurisprudential germs in Casey and Romer
into Obergefell’s equal-dignity doctrine, itself but a reinvigoration of settled
law a century old.163 Justice Kennedy is revolutionizing conservatively.
Persisting in our adherence to tiers-of-scrutiny, it becomes apparent
that sexual intimacy makes little sense as anything other than a fundamental
right. After all, Lawrence is derived from the Griswold privacy pantheon, the
paradigmatic “fundamental right.” Nothing distinguishes sexual intimacy in
Lawrence from the intimate decisions at issue in Griswold and Eisenstadt, or
Roe and Casey. All of the rights involved were deduced from the interlocking
principles of autonomous self-definition and relational privacy. As described
by Obergefell, “the fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause . . . extend to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that
define personal identity and beliefs.”164 Reasoning from that body of law,
Lawrence held “that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”165
If every other definitional privacy right is a fundamental right, why would
sexual intimacy be different?
A rational basis interpretation of Lawrence is untenable. For one, it
would not offer the “substantial protection” Lawrence mandated for a per-
son’s decisions “pertaining to sex.”166 If Lawrence was really a rational basis
nied. . . . The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but
rights come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent
in our own era.”) (citation omitted).
161. See Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2604 (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that
the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
162. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 720.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
164. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2589.
165. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559.
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case, the Texas statute could have been sustained on flimsy public health
grounds. The CDC has estimated the risk of HIV transmission from recep-
tive anal intercourse at 17 times the rate for receptive vaginal intercourse.167
Heightened scrutiny was clearly at work in Lawrence. Additionally, the tex-
tual evidence for a rational basis standard is weak. Lawrence stated that “the
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intru-
sion into the personal and private life of the individual.”168 Rational basis
advocates interpret this as the standard of review for governmental intru-
sions on sexual intimacy. But that statement can stand only for the proposi-
tion that the Texas statute failed constitutional muster regardless of scrutiny
level.169 It does not tell us whether the law would have been sustained if
Texas did have a “legitimate” state interest. Indeed, Eisenstadt too asked
whether the government interest is “reasonable” and “rationally explains the
different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons.” 170 The ab-
sence of the magic words “strict scrutiny” cannot mean the absence of a
fundamental right; otherwise, Eisenstadt would also be a rational basis case
and unmarried couples’ access to contraceptives would receive no more con-
stitutional protection than state laws regulating intrastate businesses.
Moreover, the Lawrence majority declared that Justice Stevens’ Bowers
dissent, which expressly characterized sexual intimacy as a fundamental
right, “should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.” 171
Justice Stevens had argued strenuously in Bowers that “the essential ‘liberty’
that animated the development of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Carey surely embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual
conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral.”172 The passage
Lawrence reproduced from that dissent dispels all doubt that sexual intimacy
is a fundamental right as integral to self-definition and relational privacy as
contraceptives or reproduction:
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First,
the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from con-
stitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married per-
167. See HIV Transmission Risk, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(July 1, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/risk.html.
168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
169. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
170. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
171. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
172. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship,
even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “lib-
erty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate
choices by unmarried as well as married persons.173
A person’s sexual choices, Justice Stevens continued, fall within a right to
privacy that deals “with the individual’s right to make certain unusually
important decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s, destiny. The
Court has referred to such decisions as implicating ‘basic values’ as being
‘fundamental’ and as being dignified by history and tradition.”174 This must
surely be correct. If the right to privacy does not encompass what Lawrence
described as “the most private human conduct,”175 what would qualify as a
fundamental right? Sexual behavior, including choice of partner, is basic to
our very existence and embedded in primordial instinct. By comparison,
marriage is a wholly social construct and yet it is indisputably fundamental.
As Sunstein observes, a sentiment shared by Tribe,176 the Court’s “state-
ments would be unintelligible if Lawrence were based solely on rational basis
review. . . . In the end, Lawrence is not plausibly a rational basis deci-
sion.”177 Justice Kennedy may have hoped to cabin Lawrence’s reach by dis-
cussing only “legitimate” state interests, but his initial reluctance was
doctrinally untenable. It seems he is well aware of this wrinkle he left in the
constitutional fabric. Thus, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy conceded that
Lawrence did indeed recognize a fundamental right to sexual intimacy:
[I]n effect, Bowers upheld state action that denied gays and lesbi-
ans a fundamental right that caused them pain and humiliation.
As evidenced by the dissents in that case, the facts and principles
necessary to a correct holding were known to the Bowers Court.
That is why Lawrence held Bowers was “not correct when it was
decided.”178
173. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
174. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716,
719-20 (1976)) (emphasis added).
175. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
176. See Tribe, supra note 120, at 1917 n.82 (“In Griswold, too, no ‘standard’ was an-
nounced by the Court, but what we would today call ‘strict scrutiny’ was plainly at
work.”).
177. Sunstein, supra note 150, at 47.
178. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). This remarkable admission by Justice Kennedy of the proper standard at
work in Lawrence is practically buried in the Court’s extensive and doctrinally com-
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In evaluating government interests for criminal incest statutes, strict scru-
tiny applies.
B. Reproduction
Sexual autonomy and the right to decide whether to reproduce are
inextricably intertwined. Griswold and the contraception cases, and Roe and
its progeny, protect the fundamental right both to have, and not to have,
children. Tribe characterizes the combination of Roe, Griswold, and Skinner
as Supreme Court recognition that “whether one person’s body shall be the
source of another life must be left to that person and that person alone to
decide.”179 In fact, Justice Douglas’ holding in Skinner that procreation is
“one of the basic civil rights of man” predates Griswold’s acknowledgement
of the reciprocal right not to procreate by two decades.180 It would be be-
yond strange if the state could directly penalize couples for potentially pro-
creative sexual relations without substantive constitutional scrutiny when a
complicated doctrinal framework has evolved to protect their right to abort
a pregnancy. The Griswold Court considered the right to decide whether or
not to bear a child to be so basic that Justice Goldberg’s concurrence used
the hypothetical of a statute sterilizing couples already with more than one
child as a reducto ad absurdum to refute arguments that there is no right to
contraception because such a right has no enumerated textual basis:
If upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlaw-
ing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by
the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control
also would seem to be valid. In my view, however, both types of
law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy
which are constitutionally protected.181
In turn, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Eisenstadt declared that “if
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.”182 The majority in Casey quoted this formulation directly, reaffirm-
ing the characterization of reproductive rights as a freedom of choice be-
plex Obergefell decision. As far as I am aware, it has gone unnoticed by
commentators.
179. TRIBE, supra note 104, at 1339.
180. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
181. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
182. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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tween having a child or not.183 States regulating who can have children
would be confronted with strict scrutiny. A generally applicable law that
prohibits vaginal intercourse between relatives may be an incidental burden
on the right to bear a child, but if the fundamental right to sexual auton-
omy indeed protects sexual intimacy between close blood relations, states
would have a difficult time arguing that the right to procreate excludes from
constitutional review statutes prohibiting reproduction by couples engaged
in an otherwise permissible relationship. The problem of inbreeding that
emerges in instances of vaginal intercourse raises concerns about genetic
health that will be addressed in Section III(b).
III. . . . AND THE COUNTERVAILING GOVERNMENT INTEREST[S]
The Supreme Court’s initial silence on the applicable level of scrutiny
left it, and lower courts, plenty of leeway (and confusion) in how to dispose
of a case antithetical to individual judges’ deepest personal beliefs. The
Court has already proven reluctant to grapple with the Incest Horrible by
denying certiorari in Muth v. Frank.184 Denial left in place a muddled status
quo, avoiding an otherwise unavoidably problematic extension or limitation
of Lawrence.
As Judge Manion wrote in the unanimous 7th Circuit ruling, the facts
in Muth “are not pleasant.”185 Allen Muth “was one of the oldest, and Patri-
cia [Muth] one of the youngest,” of a dysfunctional family of 14 children.
“[T]hey were in and out of foster care . . . in a cycle of sexual abuse and
incest.”186 Muth v. Frank was a GSA case; the two siblings were not reunited
until Patricia turned 18.187 The couple married soon after and had three
children.188 The Muths were discovered when they abandoned their middle
183. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (“The Court’s
decisions have . . . recognized the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child.”).
184. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 575
(2005).
185. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2005).
186. Muth, 412 F.3d at 811.
187. Jeff Jacoby, Hypocrisy on Adult Consent, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2005, http://
www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/08/28/hypoc-
risy_on_adult_consent/.
188. Muth, 412 F.3d at 811. Patricia bore one other child prior to their marriage, but it is
unclear if Allen is also the father of that child. See also Interest of Tiffany Nicole M.,
214 Wis. 2d 302, 306 (Ct. App. 1997) (indicating that the couple had three
children).
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child, Tiffany Muth, at the babysitter, who reported them to authorities. 189
The child was placed into foster care, and the Muths were tried for incest.190
At sentencing in November 1997, the judge remarked, “I believe severe
punishment is required in this case . . . I think they have to be separated. It’s
the only way to prevent them from having intercourse in the future.” 191
Allen was sentenced to eight years and Patricia to five in separate maximum
security prisons 25 miles apart.192
The Muths conviction was affirmed in January 2000 by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, which held that the Muths’ relationship was not pro-
tected by the right to privacy, and that, regardless of the right, Wisconsin
may legitimately prohibit incest.193 In April 2001, Allen Muth filed a peti-
tion for habeas corpus in federal court, now armed with the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Lawrence.194 The resulting 7th Circuit decision
affirming the conviction can only be described as lost. Faced with a proce-
dural labyrinth produced by the state court decisions and the retroactive
189. The circumstances of the abandonment are unclear. A large number of news sources
suggest that the Muths were truckers who left their children with babysitters while
they were working. I have, however, been unable to find the original source. The
babysitter contacted the authorities after Tiffany became sick and the parents could
not be found. It is clear that Tiffany was indeed neglected, causing “profound devel-
opment delays.” Interestingly, Tiffany is ultimately taken from the Muths not on the
grounds of neglect, but that their incestuous relationship renders them unfit as par-
ents. See Interest of Tiffany Nicole M., 214 Wis.2d 302, 308-13 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997).
190. Muth, 412 F.3d at 811.
191. Jacoby, supra note 187, at 1.
192. Id.
193. See Wisconsin v. Muth, 237 Wis. 2d 252 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
194. In 1997, the Muths had also challenged in Wisconsin state court the constitutional-
ity of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7). The statute provided that incestuous parenthood is
grounds for terminating parental rights. This raises a separate though related consti-
tutional issue that is beyond the scope of this paper; if the Muths are otherwise
capable parents, can a state deprive them of custody? Meyer, Pierce, Lochner (prece-
dents with an active life in today’s substantive due process jurisprudence) suggest
that plaintiffs would have a colorable claim if incest were decriminalized. See Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this court has not attempted to
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much con-
sideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to ac-
quire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(“Under the doctrine of Meyer . . . we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control.”).
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application of Lawrence, Judge Manion stated that Lawrence applies only to
homosexual sodomy despite the Supreme Court’s express holding that bans
on opposite-sex sodomy and bans on same-sex sodomy stood on the same
footing.195 Relying heavily on Justice Scalia’s dissent, Judge Manion asserted
that Lawrence did not establish a new fundamental right, a questionable
claim even before Obergefell,196 and ergo, Muth did not have “a fundamen-
tal right to engage in incest free from government proscription.”197 Ironi-
cally, it was Scalia’s dissent that argued Lawrence necessarily protects
consensual adult incest, 198 and moreover, the 7th Circuit offered no evalua-
tion whatsoever of the justifications offered by the state.
This Section questions the traditional reasons for prohibiting incest,
evaluating in turn state interests in morality, preserving the traditional fam-
ily and familial stability, genetic health, protecting children, and the preven-
tion of inherently coercive relationships. I argue that the preservation of
morality and tradition is unlikely to constitute a valid state interest in this
context. Genetic health and the prevention of inherently coercive relation-
ships offer the strongest justifications for criminal prohibition, but both
pose doctrinal problems, and existing incest statutes are tailored to neither
interest. Of course, the availability of possible (if poor) ammunition for
prohibition advocates, combined with a strong prevailing taboo, makes the
decriminalization cause an uphill battle.
A. Morality
Lawrence strongly suggests that moral disapproval, without more, is
not a legitimate state interest for criminalizing intimate personal relations
between consenting adults. First, quoting from Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Bowers, Justice Kennedy declared “the fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffi-
cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitu-
195. See Muth, 412 F.3d at 817-18 (“The ultimate question then is not whether Lawrence
is retroactive, but, rather, whether Muth is a beneficiary of the rule Lawrence an-
nounced. He is not. Lawrence did not address the constitutionality of incest statutes.
Rather, the statute at issue in Lawrence was one proscribing homosexual sodomy and
the Court, as noted above, viewed its decision as a reconsideration of Bowers, an-
other case involving homosexual sodomy . . . . There is no mention of incest in the
Court’s opinion. Lawrence also did not announce, as Muth claims it did, a funda-
mental right, protected by the Constitution, for adults to engage in all manner of
consensual sexual conduct, . . . [g]iven . . . the specific focus in Lawrence on homo-
sexual sodomy[.]”).
196. See Muth, 412 F.3d at 818.
197. See Muth, 412 F.3d at 818.
198. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tional attack.”199 Second, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence suggests that
“moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause.”200 Third, the dissent itself interpreted Bower’s reversal to
invalidate moral disapproval as a permissible regulatory justification. The
Incest Horrible arises from Justice Scalia’s objection that the law “is con-
stantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially
moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts
will be very busy indeed.”201
Criminal regulation of sexual behavior, “the most private of human
conduct” and essential to self-definition, 202 reflects more than moral disap-
proval of that conduct. It reflects moral disapproval of the group of persons
who have decided on that life path. Like anti-sodomy statutes, laws against
incest proscribe not only actions, but relationships. To arraign Czech twin
brothers Elijah and Milo Peters for incest is to punish them not for what
they are doing, but who they are doing it with. Animus toward acts is inex-
tricable from animus toward the actors when the freedom to engage in the
prohibited behavior is integral to two people’s ability to delimit the con-
tours of their chosen relationship. Moreover, the right to autonomy of sex-
ual intimacy would be incoherent even if its restriction were based solely on
the state’s animus toward pure conduct. Suppose the facially neutral sod-
omy law in Bowers were applied against a married heterosexual couple en-
gaged in oral sex. Evidently, Georgia evinced no animus toward
heterosexuals or married couples. Yet the right to privacy would mean noth-
ing if Georgia could nevertheless pull our blinds aside, reach into our bed-
rooms, and prohibit a specific sex act for no better reason than that the state
believes the act itself immoral. Justice Kennedy was right to articulate the
impermissible state interest in Lawrence as moral judgment of a “particular
practice” as opposed to a particular “group.” 203 When a law punishes indi-
viduals for their exercise of a fundamental right, like sexual intimacy, the
group-conduct distinction unravels.
To justify the enactment of a criminal law on the grounds that the
regulated conduct or person violates community morality is to admit that
the law is motivated in part by animosity. The origins of that animosity may
well be principled, to prevent child abuse for instance, but those principles
themselves are what count as state interests. Weighing morality as a regula-
199. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
200. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
201. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
202. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
203. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
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tory justification separately from the impetus behind that normative judg-
ment would double-count the state’s position. On the other hand, if the
moral condemnation is without reason, or without a constitutionally cogni-
zable reason—i.e., sectarian disapproval—then it is mere animus, and legal
prohibition is disadvantage imposed out of animosity.204 It is impossible to
disentangle morality from a bare desire to harm or inhibit. Thus, Justice
O’Connor wrote, “Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate
state interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize homo-
sexual sodomy.”205 In other words, the state is saying that the prohibition of
the thing (incest; homosexuality) is itself the government interest that justi-
fies the prohibition. A morality interest in abridging a fundamental right is
an inherently circular argument.
This does not affect prohibitions on conduct not protected by height-
ened scrutiny. Even if we ignored state interests in promoting market effi-
ciency, or the maintenance of public order, the state can still criminalize an
armed bank robbery for no reason other than the “badness” of taking by
force property that is not one’s own. Anti-graffiti legislation imposing
heightened penalties for the defacement of a gravesite, or a law prohibiting
the desecration of an animal corpse, may have no rationale besides the com-
munity’s instinct as to right and wrong. Common to all of these examples is
the absence of a fundamental right, for that which one does not have a right
to do, the state may freely prevent one from doing.
Of course, even when a claim implicates a fundamental right, the
complex relationship between the Court and morality extends beyond the
parameters of doctrinal reasoning. Daniel Piar believes there is still “linger-
ing uncertainty as to whether state action based on morality is permissi-
ble.”206 Piar makes much of Justice Kennedy’s 2007 majority opinion in
Gonzales v. Carhart, which is “laced with moral language,”207 and expresses
approval of Congress’ moral condemnation of the partial-birth abortion—
“a brutal and inhumane procedure.” 208 When confronted with a practice
that is both beyond their understanding and repulses them, the Justices
could simply vote with their conscience. Incest is such a practice. But while
Justice Kennedy’s feelings against partial-birth abortions are apparent, Gon-
204. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)
(invalidating under the Free Exercise Clause a municipal ordinance directed against a
minority religious practice deemed “inconsistent with public morals, peace, or
safety” when the law was under-inclusive as to both peace and safety).
205. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
206. Daniel Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV.
139, 140 (2013).
207. Id. at 151.
208. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
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zales never stated that morality alone is sufficient, or even has any bearing,
on the constitutionality of a statute. Rather, respecting and protecting the
life and comfort of the fetus serves as a compelling state interest that also
happens to inform why the moral disapproval exists in the first place.209
Gonzales does not articulate a vision of morality as a stand-alone interest; it
is perfectly consistent with the principle that “moral disapproval, without
any other asserted state interest” is insufficient to satisfy rational basis re-
view.210 Additionally, before we abandon legal coherence entirely, in a case
on incest relying directly on Lawrence, accepting morality as a valid regula-
tory justification would be more obviously inconsistent than Justice Ken-
nedy’s incidental distaste in Gonzales. Confronting an array of precedents
pointing in the direction that, absent a reason beyond mere disapproval, the
state has no place in our bedrooms, it is likely the justices would at least
realize the existence of such an inconsistency. How the Court responds is
another matter.
B. The Traditional Family and Familial Stability
In light of Obergefell, United States v. Windsor,211 and Moore v. East
Cleveland,212 government is likely constrained from imposing on families a
singular vision of traditional familial relationships, at least, without a reason
more compelling than age-old tradition. State-imposed maintenance of fam-
ily structures resembles a government interest in opposing a fundamental
right to define one’s own family structure. Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, the Lochner-ian ancestors of substantive due process, articu-
lated a liberty to “marry, [and] establish a home and bring up children.”213
Moore drew on both cases to strike down an East Cleveland housing ordi-
nance limiting home occupancy to nuclear family members, holding that
“the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children
and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family pat-
terns.”214 Justice Powell’s majority opinion emphasized “freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life” as a liberty protected by the
209. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 183-84 (holding that the state has an interest in protecting
fetal life).
210. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
211. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
212. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
213. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (“Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol.”) (citations omitted).
214. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505-06.
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Fourteenth Amendment,215 and strong historical traditions of a “larger con-
ception of the family” to “draw together and participate in the duties and
the satisfactions of a common home.”216
It is unclear what the right was in Moore. Before Obergefell, reading
Moore to stand for freedom from state compulsion in defining one’s own
family arrangements would not comport with the language in the decision.
That is because Moore articulated a vision of family that aligned with the
traditional family construct, invoking “the tradition of uncles, aunts, cous-
ins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and
children.”217 “Over the years,” the Court proclaimed:
[M]illions of our citizens have grown up in just such an environ-
ment, and most, surely, have profited from it. Even if conditions
of modern society have brought about a decline in extended
family households, they have not erased the accumulated wis-
dom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored
throughout our history.218
Whereas Moore, and its predecessors Meyer and Pierce,219 could have once
been interpreted as bastions of the traditional family, judicial intervention
against incest legislation would upset traditional values and leave incestuous
couples free to pursue their own radically different vision of a sexualized
family.
The gay-rights saga has since detached familial autonomy from its de-
pendency on longstanding community norms. The once ambiguous right at
stake stands for freedom from state intrusion now that it has evolved, since
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, into a right of self-definitional autonomy
and relational dignity. The “traditional family” is intimately bound with
“traditional marriage,” and a compelling state interest in promoting tradi-
tional relationships for tradition’s sake would effectively abrogate any right
to autonomy in one’s intimate relational choices. In Windsor, the federal
government could not deprive same-sex couples the benefits of marriage if
those couples were legally wed under state law. 220 The Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group’s counsel argued that Congress “has a deep and abiding
215. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639-640 (1974)).
216. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505.
217. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
218. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-5.
219. It is but slight hyperbole to say that the right “to marry, establish a home and bring
up children” in the rural bliss of 1923 Nebraska is practically a line out of Marlowe.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
220. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
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interest in encouraging responsible procreation and child rearing,”221 but
did not address whether government can have an interest in promoting
traditional wife-husband families. This seems to have been a judicious
choice. Windsor recognized that the Defense of Marriage Act was meant to
“defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,” referencing a
House Report statement that the “effort to redefine ‘marriage’ to extend to
homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally
alter the institution of marriage.”222 But instead of evaluating the adequacy
of the offered rationale, the Court used it as evidence that “interference with
the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in
the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of
the federal statute. It was its essence.”223 In other words, the Court realized
that an interest in “traditional” family structure is no interest at all because
depriving one kind of relationship of equal dignity in order to benefit an-
other kind cannot be a proper state method of incentivizing individuals to
adopt the state’s relational preferences. 224 Obergefell amplified this princi-
ple, characterizing the traditional definition of marriage as exclusive to a
man and a woman as an “unjustified inequality within our most fundamen-
tal institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” 225 As Chief
Justice Roberts remarked, Obergefell “order[ed] the transformation of a so-
cial institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for
the Kalahari Busmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the
Aztecs.” 226
Obergefell and Windsor recognized that reasoning from tradition, like
reasoning from morality, is inherently circular. The elevation of “tradi-
tional” relationships necessarily implies the subordination of “untraditional”
relationships, and in Obergefell, “a long history of disapproval of [same-sex]
relationships” worked “a grave and continuing harm.” 227 In the incest con-
text, close blood relatives are not yet permitted to pursue even an inherently
221. Brief on the Merits for Respondent, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the
United States House of Representatives at 11, Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (No. 12-
307) (quoting House Rep. 12, 13).
222. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting H.R. 3369).
223. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681.
224. This is not to say that government cannot protect the family, far from it. It is pre-
sumably free to incentivize the creation of family units by denying an unmarried
individual tax benefits slated for married couples. A Tocqueville inspired majority
declared in Obergefell that “marriage is a keystone of our social order . . . marriage is
‘the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.’ ” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)
(quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211).
225. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
226. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
227. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590-91.
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unequal relationship. Yet surely, after Lawrence, the government cannot pro-
mote traditional relational structures by compelling conformity through the
compulsory mechanisms of the penal code. It would be incoherent to justify
continued interference with a fundamental relational right via reference to
states’ mere preference for a different relational structure; the whole point of
a right is that it can be asserted against the amorphous preferences of the
state. Indeed, as the Court realized in Windsor and Obergefell, appeal to
tradition, without more, is not only an illusory interest in preserving what-
has-always-been-done for no better reason than that it is what-has-always-
been-done, but may itself be evidence of impermissible animus toward cer-
tain relationships. Justifying incest legislation as an effort to preserve “tradi-
tional” family relationships is to define the government interest as the
abridgment of the right.
States’ interest in the family becomes a more persuasive argument
when articulated as an interest, not in imposing a singular time-bound vi-
sion of propriety, but in preserving the stability of existing families. Same-
sex intimacy and incest are distinguishable in their impact on family struc-
ture. As the Supreme Court of Ohio observed in sustaining the conviction
of a stepfather who had consensual sex with his stepdaughter, “stepchildren
and adopted children have been included as possible victims of the crime of
incest because society is concerned with the integrity of the family, includ-
ing step and adoptive relationships as well as blood relationships, and sexual
activity is equally disruptive, whatever the makeup of the family.”228 As one
commentator notes, same-sex couples who raise children have defined the
terms of their family structures at the outset, while incest introduces sexual
tension into a family that already exists.229 “Think of all the opposite-sex
friendships you and your friends have cumulatively destroyed by ‘crossing
the line.’ Now imagine doing that to your family.”230
But while the “permanency and stability important to children’s best
interests” is an important consideration, a person’s relational autonomy is
not hostage to child-rearing.231 “An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is
not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any state.”232 A
focus on child-rearing also leaves unanswered whether the government’s in-
terest in preserving the stability of extant families could overcome a right to
sexual autonomy once the children are grown and have left the nest. Child
228. Ohio v. Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 517 (Ohio 2007).
229. William Saletan, Incest Is Cancer – The David Epstein Case: If Homosexuality is OK,
Why is Incest Wrong? SLATE, Dec. 14, 2010, http://www.slate.com/articles/
health_and_science/human_nature/2010/12/incest_ is_cancer.html.
230. Id.
231. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
232. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
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rearing fades into the background when the participants are all adults. If
child abuse is not at issue, why does it matter to the state whether relatives
alter their relationships with each other? With children out of the picture,
imposing on unwilling individuals stability for stability’s sake seems just as
empty a government justification as perpetuating traditional families for tra-
dition’s sake.
It is clear that the recent gay-rights revolution has upset Moore’s con-
servative implications and resuscitated the self-definitional approach to fam-
ily structure. Justice Stevens was far-sighted in comparing sexual intimacy
with miscegenation in his Bowers dissent.233 Just as “neither history nor tra-
dition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional at-
tack,”234 tradition cannot rescue state laws that treat some relationships as
lesser than others. Windsor and Obergefell point away from a historically-
oriented conception of family organization toward the liberty of individuals
to pursue an arrangement they find dignified and proper, freed from norma-
tive constraints. The state may not socially engineer the ideal family as de-
fined by history and tradition, or freeze extant families into a stable
configuration. It suffices to say that the validity of a governmental interest
in either perpetuating or preserving certain family arrangements, without
more, may clash with an active jurisprudence that upends state-preferred
family arrangements. Concrete policy reasons that support a state’s choice to
preserve family stability in the first place, such as child welfare, provide
firmer foundations for incest legislation.
C. Eugenics or Genetic Health?
Genetic diseases loom large in any talk of incest. Since Sturgeon wrote
the excerpt reproduced at the beginning of this paper, the biological sciences
have established that inbreeding does indeed increase the chance of off-
spring inheriting a recessive genetic disorder. Genetic health is not as weak a
justification as either Hammer or Cahill suggested, but it is entirely inappli-
cable to any incest statute that encompasses sexual relationships between
adoptive relatives, or same-sex relatives, or prohibits any sexual-behavior
other than unprotected vaginal intercourse. Additionally, a genetic health
rationale is still problematic in the context of unprotected vaginal inter-
course between consanguineous relatives because of interpretative problems
233. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
234. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
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involving points of comparison and the Supreme Court’s anti-eugenics rul-
ing in Skinner.235
The incestuous relationships relevant to us involve relatives of the first
degree—between siblings, and parents with children—whose offspring will
be homozygous at 25% of gene loci, that is, they inherit identical gene
copies from each parent in a quarter of all genes.236 This is expressed as a
coefficient of inbreeding (F) of 0.25. 237 In incestuous relationships between
double first cousins, F=0.125, and in first cousins, F=0.0625.238 The Center
for Disease Control (“CDC”) has estimated the population background risk
for congenital defects in the first year of life to be 3-4%.239 Inbreeding be-
tween first cousins leads to a “1.7-2.8% increased risk for congenital defects
above the population background risk. There is an approximately 4.4% in-
creased risk for preproductive mortality above the population background
risk, some of which include major congenital defects”240 By contrast, off-
spring born to mothers aged 45 are at a 5-6% risk of Down Syndrome
alone.241
The risk increase is significantly greater in the offspring of first degree
relatives, who have four times the number of homozygous genes as the off-
spring of first cousins. The problem does not lend itself to easy experimen-
tation. The family dysfunction that accompanies many of these
relationships makes it difficult to determine whether increased child mor-
bidity is a social or biological consequence, and there are often mental
health issues involved that are themselves a product of preexisting genetic
disorders.242 Estimates are thus problematic. At first glance, studies done in
the late 60s to early 80s suggest that as many as half of such children suf-
235. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“The power to sterilize, if
exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless
hands, it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither
and disappear.”).
236. See Bennett et. al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguineous Couples and
Their Offspring: Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 11 J.
OF GENETIC COUNSELING 90, Fig. 1 at 100 (2002).
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id. at Table II at 104 (exhibiting the finding that this is the risk for “major birth
defects in 1st year of life”).
240. Id. at 115.
241. See Ernest B. Hook & Agneta Lindsjo, Down Syndrome in Live Births by Single Year
Maternal Age Interval in a Swedish Study: Comparison with Results from a New York
State Study, 30 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 19, Table 1 at 20 (1978).
242. See Alan H. Bittles, Genetic Aspects of Inbreeding and Incest, in INBREEDING, INCEST,
AND THE INCEST TABOO 38, 49-51 (Arthur P. Wolf & William H. Durham eds.,
2005) (discussing control group inadequacies in existing studies on the genetic im-
pact of inbreeding).
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fered sudden deaths, autosomal recessive disorders, congenital deformations,
severe intellectual handicaps, or other problems.243 Combining these stud-
ies, the “excess level of death and severe defect in the offspring of incestuous
unions (a proportion of which may have been nongenetic in origin) was
31.4%” above the control group, which itself had an 8% risk of death or
serious defect.244 These numbers include non-genetic morbidity and other
problems because these studies did not adjust for sample biases, and only
two of the studies had a control group.245 Alternatively, since the F-value of
first degree relatives is four times that of first cousins, and the offspring of
first cousin unions are estimated at a 1.7-2.8% risk above the background,
“then the predicted risk to the offspring of first-degree relatives would be at
6.8-11.2% risk above the population background for significant birth de-
fects.”246 Using the CDC estimate of the general background risk, this puts
children of first degree relatives at somewhere between a 1 in 10 and 1 in
6.7 risk of significant genetic defects.
At what point is the genetic risk so high that the state should be free to
draw the line? The problem (especially from an equal protection perspec-
tive) with identifying any numerical risk as sufficient to permit government
prohibition of procreative activity is that non-consanguineous couples who
are at as high a risk (or higher) of passing genetic defects to their children
are not criminally barred from procreation. Parents with schizophrenia,
Down Syndrome, congenital heart defects, or who are just over a certain
age, can all legally bear and beget children. Of course, this alone does not
doom the genetic health justification. But since the Supreme Court has
ruled that there is a fundamental right in bearing children, we must ask
whether the genetic health of the population is a compelling state interest
that fits an incest-triggered prohibition closely enough to pass constitutional
muster. Skinner offers some indications. Under the dubious reasoning that
criminality is inheritable, Oklahoma passed a law mandating the steriliza-
tion of “habitual criminals.”247 The Court held that the law violated equal
protection because white collar criminals were exempt.248 Justice Douglas’
243. See e.g., Bennett et. al., supra note 236, at 106-7.
244. Id. at 107. One study had a unique control group available in the offspring of the
parents’ other non-consanguineous unions. See Eva Seemanova, A Study of Children
in Incestuous Marriages, 21 HUMAN HEREDITY 108 (1971).
245. Bittles, supra note 242, at 49-53.
246. Bennett et al., supra note 236, at 107.
247. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
248. Sterilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny, with
immunity for those who are embezzlers, is a clear, pointed, unmistakable
discrimination. Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that he who commits
larceny by trespass or trick or fraud has biologically inheritable traits which
he who commits embezzlement lacks. . . . In terms of fines and imprison-
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majority opinion was heavily informed by an autonomy undercurrent
sounding in the Due Process Clause:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devas-
tating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disap-
pear . . . . [S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a State
makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or other-
wise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types
of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just
and equal laws.249
Skinner, decided during the Second World War in the shadow of the Holo-
caust, renders eugenics a questionable state interest. For one, prohibiting
certain groups from having children would have the same effect as physi-
cally sterilizing them. For another, eugenics implicates more than bodily
autonomy, but also the power to subordinate and destroy undesirable
groups.
Incest, however, is distinctively different in that no one is prevented
from reproducing by a ban on procreating with a parent, child, or sibling. If
Oklahoma deprived prisoners of “a basic liberty” in having children with
anyone, then incest statutes are far less invasive and the eugenics problem is
not implicated. This is separate from the problem of choice of sexual part-
ner in that public health offers a strong reason for imposing a small burden
on our range of procreative partners.250 The state can still respect an incestu-
ous couple’s sexual autonomy by requiring them to use contraception, pro-
vided that the extent of the harm is enough to outweigh Griswold’s concerns
over the state monitoring the marital bed. On the other hand, while Skinner
offers us no definitive answer as to whether our unfettered choice of procre-
ative (as opposed to romantic) partners is a fundamental right, if it is, then
ment, the crimes of larceny and embezzlement rate the same under the
Oklahoma code. Only when it comes to sterilization are the pains and pen-
alties of the law different. The equal protection clause would indeed be a
formula of empty words if such conspicuously artificial lines could be
drawn.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42.
249. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
250. See discussion supra Part II(A)(2).
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the burden posed by mandated contraception is not de minimis at all for
those who want to reproduce only with a specific blood relative.
From a social welfare perspective, the increased healthcare costs for the
community combined with the state’s interest in preventing children from
being born with genetic defects that may cause suffering and death would
justify incest prohibitions narrowly tailored to consanguineous relatives.
One hesitates in that the same reasoning would justify barring someone
with a congenital birth defect from reproducing with someone else who has
that defect. The scope of potential procreative partners is minimally con-
strained in both hypotheticals. One distinction is that the number of people
with a given birth defect is (usually) far higher than the number of people in
a person’s immediate family. Yet, many progressives living in a post-Law-
rence world would still balk at the idea that a fundamental right to
reproduce excludes a fundamental right to choose the particular individual
with whom to reproduce. Even narrow preventative means, such as checking
to ensure the use of contraception, raise grave privacy concerns. In evaluat-
ing the tailoring of individual statutes, those barring procreation with non-
consanguineous relatives, or barring sexual conduct beyond intercourse, are
over-inclusive.
D. Children
The Muth court made sure to include the sordid facts of how Tiffany,
the Muths’ daughter, had been raised. “Tiffany was significantly underde-
veloped” and was:
. . . a non-verbal, three and one-half year old who behaved and
physically appeared to be more like a two-year-old child. She was
not toilet trained or able to feed herself and she displayed little
or no emotion. Other evidence indicated that the child was sig-
nificantly neglected and that Patricia and Allen had no relation-
ship with the child.251
Indeed, most prosecutions for incest are made alongside a concurrent prose-
cution for child-abuse and statutory rape. 252 But, Tiffany’s mistreatment,
while harrowing, is strikingly irrelevant to whether her parents have a right
to be in a sexual relationship with each other.253 Not all incestuous couples
251. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2005).
252. Bratt, supra note 15, at 257 (stating that 94 out of 96 randomly sampled criminal
apellate court decisions allege incest where the participants involved were an adult
defendant and  a minor child victim).
253. One possible argument is that incest statutes may provide a helpful alternative for
prosecutors who have trouble establishing the elements of child abuse. Yet I struggle
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bear children, and not all those who do abuse their children. Child abuse is
most directly addressed by laws against child abuse. Even if O’Connor’s
concurrence in Lawrence were controlling, the existence in every jurisdiction
of a legal apparatus already perfectly tailored to the harm begs the question,
what is the incest statute for? The answer leads to other possible explana-
tions, leaving child protection defunct as a plausible rationale.
One possible rejoinder is that incestuous couplings are such radical
departures from conventional norms that the parents are themselves more
likely both to have been abused, and therefore to abuse or neglect their
children in turn. Along this vein, incest legislation is not reactive but pre-
scriptive. It attempts to prevent such unions from forming in the first place
thereby reducing the number of at-risk children. But such an explanation is
crudely fit, speculative, and lacks scientific support. As the US General Ac-
counting Office reported to the House Subcommittee on Crime, while
there is “widespread belief that there is a ‘cycle of sexual abuse,’ ” the re-
search is inconclusive as to whether child victims become child abusers.254
E. Inherently Coercive Relationships
The prevention of inherently coercive relationships offers a stronger
basis for distinguishing incest from homosexuality. It is also the basis that
the Lawrence majority itself offers to inoculate its decision against the
Scalian slope: “[t]he present case does not involve minors. It does not in-
volve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in rela-
tionships where consent might not easily be refused.”255 The Court has all
but invited states to respond to a hypothetical incest challenge using the
anti-coercion rationale. Indeed, as Tribe and Dorf wrote in their Obergefell
amicus brief, “[l]aws forbidding or denying recognition [of incest] can be
defended based on their protection of the rights and interests of persons
other than fully consenting adults.”256 But as is the case for genetic health, a
compelling interest in the prevention of “relationships where consent might
to imagine a situation where an offender cannot be prosecuted for either some form
of abuse, or statutory rape, but can be prosecuted under an incest statute that would
require proof of sexual contact. Even if such a situation could arise, the application
of strict scrutiny means that the solution is not to create an alternative offense inci-
dental to the wrong the state means to prevent, but a revised abuse statute with a
lower prosecutorial bar.
254. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-96-178, CYCLE OF SEXUAL ABUSE: RESEARCH
INCONCLUSIVE ABOUT WHETHER CHILD VICTIMS BECOME ADULT ABUSERS 2
(1996).
255. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
256. Brief for Professors Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-
556).
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not easily be refused”257 poses not only considerable theoretical problems,
but also tailoring difficulties for most state statutes.
For one, none of them addresses the growing challenges posed by GSA
and the open-adoption reforms that gained traction in the 1970s. Blanket
prohibitions criminalize natural biosocial impulses in a setting where the
inherent risk of coercion seems little different than in any other context. For
another, even in non-GSA cases, incest statutes are universally over-inclusive
by banning sexual relations between siblings close in age.258 By some esti-
mates, sibling incest may in fact be the most common form of first-degree
incest. 259 The state would have a hard time characterizing a consensual
relationship between a sibling pair in their 30s as inherently coercive. In
such relationships, the distinction between victim and perpetrator become
blurred. One wonders at what age such a presumption of coercion becomes
too problematic to sustain under any level of heightened scrutiny. Further,
we have not heretofore criminalized sexual relations between bosses and
their employees. If the state has the power to punish incest because parent-
child relationships are inherently coercive, then we must contemplate
whether the state also has the authority to ban consensual office romances.
The answer could be a simple—but troubling—yes.260
However, the most troubling aspect of the anti-coercion rationale is its
inherently speculative nature. No matter what, incest criminalization will be
over-inclusive in that a substantial amount of truly consensual conduct
would be swept up in the prohibition. Of course, while strict scrutiny is
often described as strict in theory, fatal in fact, a 2006 study by Adam
Winkler shows that challenged legislation has been sustained in approxi-
mately 30% of such cases,261 including 27% of suspect classifications,262 and
22% of substantive due process infringements.263 Nevertheless, if we ac-
knowledge autonomy of sexual behavior and intimate relationships as a fun-
damental right, then it is odd that the compelling government interest
257. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
258. See supra discussion accompanying notes 45-52.
259. See, e.g., VERNON R. WIEHE, SIBLING ABUSE: HIDDEN PHYSICAL, EMOTIONAL, AND
SEXUAL TRAUMA 57-58 (2d ed. 1997).
260. At least two states, Connecticut and Ohio, deem it a felony for certain school em-
ployees to engage in sexual intercourse with students enrolled at that school regard-
less of the student’s age, or the difference in age between the employee and the
student. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53 A-71(A)(8) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.03(7) (2009).
261. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 818 (2006). This percentage
rises to 74% in Free-Exercise claims for exemptions from generally applicable laws, at
which point one wonders if it is still strict scrutiny. Id. at 861.
262. See id. at 834.
263. See id. at 863.
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offered by the states takes the form of an irrefutable presumption against the
fundamental right and in favor of the government. The very nature of the
anti-coercion interest, if adopted by courts, undermines the narrow-tailor-
ing prong. A ban on incest is not a well-tailored means of regulating inher-
ently coercive relationships. States could create a separate age of consent for
incest. They can exempt relationships where there is no identifiable victim
or perpetrator, for instance, when twins are involved. The anti-coercion in-
terest is not as clear an answer as the Supreme Court would like.
F. Pandora’s Box: How to Criminalize Incest
Additionally, the two strongest state interests, genetic health and anti-
coercion, are in tension with one another. A genetic health basis would
require a statute to apply only to unprotected vaginal intercourse between
consanguineous relatives. The prohibition of sexual conduct generally, or of
sex between adoptive family members, would be wildly over-inclusive. By
contrast, statutes justified under an anti-coercion rationale would probably
need some form of exemption for GSA relationships and consanguineous
relatives close in age. Prohibitions that are limited to intercourse, or that
exclude adopted parents, would be under-inclusive. Many incest prohibi-
tions, as they stand now, are tailored to neither interest.264 Those that re-
main would be left in a precarious position given that neither genetic health
nor anti-coercion may be compelling enough as stand-alone government
interests under a strict scrutiny regime. While genetic health condones gov-
ernment restrictions on procreation by those suffering from serious genetic
disorders, anti-coercion justifies criminal punishment of workplace relation-
ships between employers and employees.
In a move reminiscent of Bowers, the 7th Circuit dealt with the im-
passe by straining Lawrence to apply only to homosexual sodomy, while
refusing to acknowledge sexual intimacy as a fundamental right.265 But we
need not abdicate hard-fought liberties in such a manner.266 More permis-
sive prohibitions can pass strict scrutiny if we pool the varied regulatory
justifications discussed in Part III into an aggregation of concerns that, to-
gether, creates a compelling state interest in prohibiting incest. Relation-
264. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-102 (2014) (Utah bans sexual intercourse and
insertion of seminal fluid between both blood and adoptive relatives, including first
cousins. Limited to intercourse and encompassing relatives that are unlikely to have
grown up together, it is under-inclusive as to inherently coercive relationships. At the
same time, by including adoptive relatives, the statute is over-inclusive when it comes
to the genetic-health rationale.).
265. See generally Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
266. For a policy argument on why incest legislation should be reformed on the basis of
the harm principle, see Inbred Obscurity, supra note 19.
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ships between employers and employees may be coercive, but incest also
raises additional worries about abuse and public health. The tensions be-
tween the various points in this continuum of legitimate concerns do not
dissipate. The fact that incest poses such diffuse problems requires a legisla-
tive response that addresses the core conduct where all of these problems
overlap. Incest is the common nexus—the Pandora’s Box—of multiple
lesser social ills; as such, it is a significant source of harm, and the elimina-
tion of Pandora’s Box itself becomes the compelling state interest.
To satisfy tailoring, we must identify the core of incestuous conduct
where all of the constituent components of Pandora’s Box overlap, and
criminalize only the conduct that falls within that core. Such a statute,
could take the following form:
Vaginal intercourse between blood relatives of the first and sec-
ond degrees is prohibited where:
1. There is a substantial age-gap between partners,
2. The younger partner has not attained an increased age of
consent,
3. Both partners have had significant contact before the age of
18, and
4. Both partners are capable of having children and neither
partner uses contraception.
The state carries the burden of proving each element. The age limita-
tions and the meaning of “significant contact” would be somewhat arbi-
trary, but line drawing is unavoidable. This statutory framework draws on
both genetic health and anti-coercion as its justificatory predicates. Each
state interest may be insufficiently compelling in isolation, but they are mu-
tually reinforcing when considered together. This approach addresses GSA
and allows consenting adults to exercise their sexual autonomy in contexts
where the inherent coerciveness of the relationship is not at issue, and where
there is also a low chance of reproduction. The proposed fourth prong, the
most suspect element of the proposed framework, would be difficult to
prove or enforce. Additionally, enforcement involves the state policing con-
traception within a private space, which is what the Court found so odious
in Griswold.267 The state’s interest in genetic health could plausibly obviate
the individual’s fundamental privacy right to procreate. But, if genetic
267. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (“Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.”).
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health divorced of all other concerns is indeed so troubling to us, then our
community would need to have a conversation about the morality of bar-
ring reproduction between unrelated couples—known carriers of inheritable
disorders, those with undesirable traits, or parents above a certain age—that
also pose increased genetic risks for offspring.
IV. CONCLUSION: INCEST IN A POST-LAWRENCE, POST-OBERGEFELL
WORLD
Given Obergefell’s extension of the right to marry to non-traditional
couples who are entitled to equal dignity under the law, the invalidation of
criminal incest legislation on the basis of the right to sexual intimacy would
also necessitate the lifting of consanguinity barriers to marriage. Such a re-
sult would loom large in the mind of any judge or justice confronted with
an incest challenge. Pandora’s Box is also an unrealistic prospect. It would
require the wholesale revision of incest legislation in every state except
Rhode Island and Ohio.268 Doctrine alone cannot explain the Court’s con-
stitutional jurisprudence. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously described law as
the “evening dress which the new-comer puts on to make itself presentable
according to conventional requirements.” 269 Judges’ ultimate refusals to
strike down incest legislation could well be informed by their devotion to
extralegal norms and subjective right versus wrong, but such considerations
must still be expressed in legal form. Indeed, the Court has already pre-
selected its doctrinal answers to the Incest Horrible. As Anton Chekov once
said of theater, a line Pamela Karlan quoted in commenting on the Supreme
Court’s 2012 decision upholding the Affordable Care Act,270 “[i]f in Act I
you have a pistol hanging on the wall, then it must fire in the last act.”271
Lawrence is littered with pistols. First, one could disfigure the Court’s si-
lence and refuse to recognize sexual intimacy as a fundamental right, the
way the 7th Circuit did. Second, one could take shelter in the familiar spec-
ter of deformed children, blind to grossly over-inclusive state laws and the
ethical dilemmas posed by eugenics. Third, one could point to Justice Ken-
nedy’s express carve-out for “relationships where consent might not easily be
refused,”272 and in so doing ignore poor-tailoring, the plight of GSA plain-
tiffs, and the oddity of abridging a fundamental right with an irrefutable
presumption of coerciveness that works against the plaintiffs and in favor of
268. See supra discussion accompanying notes 45-52.
269. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880).
270. See Pamela Karlan, No Respite for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012,  http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/opinion/sunday/no-respite-for-liberals.html.
271. DONALD RAYFIELD, ANTON CHEKHOV: A LIFE 203 (1997).
272. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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the government. Fourth, the justices could discard tiers of scrutiny alto-
gether, an approach that would offer endless flexibility as to the rigor of
judicial balancing. But it should be telling that, out of the four, and now
five, articles thus far dealing with the constitutionality of incest laws, every
single one questions the rationality of sustaining criminal prohibitions. 273 To
the social progressives I say Scalia had a point.274 To the conservatives I echo
Cahill: be careful what you wish for.275
Was this all an interesting but pointless intellectual exercise? The very
notion of doctrinal cohesion has been besieged for some time now. But
norms change. Remember that in his Poe dissent, Justice Harlan thought
constitutional protection for homosexuality ridiculous.276 We cannot know
what the incest taboo will look like two or three decades from now. Aware-
ness of GSA is growing and incest is making its way into mainstream art
and literature.277 In the last decade alone, a not-insignificant number of
incestuous adult couples have outed themselves around the world or taken
to the anonymous safety of internet forums.278 They have been followed by
273. See Hammer, supra note 19 (arguing that criminalization is unconstitutional given
Lawrence’s broad language); Tuskey, supra note 23 (arguing that Muth v. Frank’s
constrained interpretation of Lawrence was the only way to avoid doctrinal absurd-
ity); McDonnell, supra note 16 (asserting that incest laws can pass heightened ra-
tional basis review but would likely fail strict scrutiny, and that from a “realist”
perspective, the Court would find a way to distinguish incest from homosexuality);
Bratt, supra note 15 (writing before Lawrence or Bowers that the Griswold line of
cases gives incestuous couples a constitutional right to marry).
274. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority hold-
ing invalidating anti-sodomy legislation under a right to intimate sexual conduct
would also necessitate the invalidation of laws against conduct like incest, bestiality,
and polygamy).
275. See supra discussion accompanying notes 25-34.
276. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
277. See, e.g., GEORGE R. R. MARTIN, GAME OF THRONES (1996).
278. See Johann Hari, Forbidden Love, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 9, 2002, http://
www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2002/jan/09/familyandrelationships.features103
(“And it began to spill out: that she had made contact with lots of people over the
internet (and consequently in person): boys, girls, fathers, mothers, who are sleeping
with their kin . . . . So now there are chatrooms and websites that are de facto
support groups for people engaged in incest. And what they want is to normalise
what we have long considered to be profoundly abnormal. It was on this basis that
Karen said Rob was ‘overreacting’ - she had insinuated herself into an online ‘com-
munity’ of people who reassured themselves that they were not freaks. Rob and I
spent a few nights gawping at the disguised but fairly developed pro-incest (or, to be
more accurate, pro-tolerating incest) areas of the net in an attempt to understand
Karen. The exponents of incest that we talked to in cyberspace were very keen to
draw a distinction between ‘consensual incest’ on the one hand and abuse, rape and
paedophilia on the other. Consensual incest, we were told by ‘JimJim2’ from Onta-
rio, is ‘when two adults who just happen to be related get it on. You can’t help who
you fall in love with, it just happens. I fell in love with my sister and I’m not
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an increasingly active media debate over whether sex between consenting
adults should still be criminal.279 Like homosexuality, what is unthinkable
or patently immoral to us today may not be so absurd later on. Legalization
could have profound consequences that are impossible to predict; never un-
derestimate the prowess of savvy legal arbitrageurs. In states where sexual
relations between adoptive relatives are permitted, the rich are already
adopting their lovers to reap the tax benefits.280 Near-universal abhorrence
of sex between close relatives still exists. Squeamish judges will likely con-
tinue dodging the issue in the manner of Muth v. Frank. But if Lawrence
stands for a fundamental right to intimate sexual conduct, we must con-
front its implications and demarcate its boundaries. While our rights are not
absolute, constitutional law exists in large part to ensure that they are not
merely aspirational. I hope that this Article offers a viable stopping point
somewhere short of the bottom of the slope. 
ashamed . . . . I only feel sorry for my mom and dad, I wish they could be happy for
us. We love each other. It’s nothing like some old man who tries to fuck his three-
year-old, that’s evil and disgusting . . . . Of course we’re consenting, that’s the most
important thing. We’re not fucking perverts. What we have is the most beautiful
thing in the world.’ ”).
279. See, e.g., Curtis M. Wong, Should Incest Between Consenting Adult Siblings Be Legal-
ized?  Experts Sound Off, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 10, 2014, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/09/legalization-incestuous-relationships-
_n_5959494.html; Paul Behrens, Do We Need a Law Against Incest?, THE GUARD-
IAN, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/15/law-
against-incest.
280. See Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect
Adults Who Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution? 32
HAMLINE L. REV. 95 (2009).
